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ABSTRACT 
How dangerous must a person be to justify the state in locking her up for 
the greater good? The bail reform movement, which aspires to limit pretrial 
detention to the truly dangerous—and which has looked to algorithmic risk 
assessments to quantify danger—has brought this question to the fore. 
Constitutional doctrine authorizes pretrial detention when the government’s 
interest in safety “outweighs” an individual’s interest in liberty, but it does not 
specify how to balance these goods. If detaining ten presumptively innocent people 
for three months is projected to prevent one robbery, is it worth it? 
This Article confronts the question of what degree of risk justifies pretrial 
preventive detention if one takes the consequentialist approach of current law 
seriously. Surveying the law, we derive two principles: 1) detention must avert 
greater harm (by preventing crime) than it inflicts (by depriving a person of liberty) 
and 2) prohibitions against pretrial punishment mean that the harm experienced by 
the detainee cannot be discounted in the cost-benefit calculus. With this conceptual 
framework in place, we develop a novel empirical method for estimating the 
relative harms of incarceration and crime victimization that we call “Rawlsian 
cost-benefit analysis”: a survey method that asks respondents to choose between 
being the victim of certain crimes or being jailed for varying time periods. The 
results suggest that even short periods of incarceration impose grave harms, such 
that a person must pose an extremely high risk of serious crime in order for 
detention to be justified. No existing risk assessment tool is sufficient to identify 
individuals who warrant detention. The empirical results demonstrate that the 
stated consequentialist rationale for pretrial detention cannot begin to justify our 
current detention rates, and suggest that the existing system veers uncomfortably 
close to pretrial punishment. The degree of discord between theory and practice 
demands a rethinking of pretrial law and policy. 
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Suppose we can avert an armed robbery by incarcerating ten people for 
thirty days each. We do not know which of the ten would otherwise commit the 
crime, and the incarceration is not justified as punishment. Is it worth it? How many 
people should we be willing to lock up to prevent one future crime?  
“None!,” you may answer, on the ground that the state may never lock up 
any person solely to prevent future crime—at least not any person who is a 
responsible agent with her cognitive faculties intact. We live in a liberal democracy, 
not a dystopia.1 You may be forgiven; this view has wide currency among 
thoughtful people.2 
But your indignation runs counter to the facts and the law. Contrary to 
common perception, preventive detention is not just the stuff of science fiction. 
Governments of contemporary liberal democracies routinely engage in preventive 
detention of many forms. Pretrial detention is one type. Other types include juvenile 
detention, immigration detention, and manifold variants of short- and long-term 
civil commitment.3 In each of these fields, the government claims authority to 
deprive people of liberty solely on the basis that custody is necessary to prevent a 
person from committing future harm.4 The state makes no claim that the person to 
be detained has forfeited her right to liberty or that the deprivation is deserved. The 
detention is not punishment. Instead, that detention is “regulatory.” The U.S. 
Supreme Court has long authorized such practices.5 Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
functional governance without them.  
Nonetheless, preventive detention is terrifying. It does not adhere to the 
central constraint on criminal punishment, that it may be imposed only for a past 
wrongful act.6 The justification for preventive detention is merely “risk,” and risk 
is amorphous. So the central question for any preventive detention regime is what 
kind and degree of risk is sufficient to justify the detention at issue. This is 
fundamentally a cost-benefit question: How much harm must we avert for the 
benefit of averting it to outweigh the costs of detention? If we incarcerate people 
1 See MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002). 
2 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventative Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 
56 VA. L. Rev. 371 (1970); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971); see also infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra Part I.A. 
4 There are also forms of preventive detention that seek to avert unintentional rather than, or in addition 
to, willful acts of harm. Examples include quarantine to prevent the spread of communicable disease, as we 
know all too well, and jury sequestration.   
5 See infra notes 32-38, 72 and accompanying text. 
6 See H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 28, 44 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining how this constraint on punishment “maximizes 
individual freedom within the coercive power of law”); DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008) (describing conceptual constraints on punishment). 
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who have a twenty percent chance of otherwise committing an assault during the 
period of detention, we can expect to prevent one assault for every five detentions. 
Is that a net benefit? How much liberty should we sacrifice to prevent one crime?  
As is, there is nothing approaching a consensus answer to this question.7  
Even in longstanding preventive detention regimes, the relevant legal standards are 
vague at best.8 Generations of scholars have lamented the lack of legal guidance. 
Few have offered specific guidance themselves.9 The problem is that the question 
requires an explicit tradeoff between liberty and security, values that are 
infrequently measured and difficult to compare.  
Difficulties notwithstanding, the bail reform movement has now placed the 
question of what risk justifies preventive detention squarely at center stage.10 
Jurisdictions around the country are forsaking money bail in favor of more 
intentional decisions about pretrial custody. The new systems aspire to detain those 
arrested persons who pose a true threat and release everyone else on appropriate 
conditions.11 (Flight risk is also a concern in the pretrial context, but a distinctly 
secondary one in practice.12) This aspiration requires each pretrial system to decide 
what kind of threat justifies detention. The advent of statistical risk assessment has 
crystallized the question further by forcing courts and stakeholders to deal in 
quantified probabilities, and to confront the limits of prediction.13 Every 
jurisdiction that authorizes pretrial detention, and every court that imposes it, must 
decide what degree of risk warrants depriving a person of liberty. 
This Article tackles the question of when pretrial detention is warranted to 
prevent future crime.14 Whereas the great bulk of prior scholarship on pretrial 
7 Christopher Slogobin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2003) (urging scholars 
and courts to develop more coherent standards for preventive deprivations of liberty). 
8 See infra Part I.A. 
9 See Alan M. Dershowitz, The Origins Of Pretrial Confinement In Anglo-American Law—Part I: The 
English Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 60 (1974) (“We have not even begun to ask these kinds of questions, 
or to develop modes of analysis for answering them . . . .”). 
10 Accord Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 494 (2018) (noting that bail 
reform “holds great promise, but also raises an extremely difficult question: what probability that a person will 
commit unspecified future crime justifies detention . . . ?”).  
11 See Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from Jail, 
Explained, Vox.com (Oct. 17, 2018). 
12 Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L. J. 1344, 1351 
(2014) (“Historically, the U.S. system of bail and associated pretrial detention was employed solely to prevent 
pretrial flight, but increasingly, the many individuals awaiting trial in jail are detained because a judge has 
deemed them potentially dangerous.”). For a thoughtful discussion of the various kinds of risk often lumped 
together as “flight risk”, see Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2018). 
13 John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk Management, 2 INT’L. J. 
OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 1, 6 (2003) (“The necessity for choosing a decision threshold for risk 
management decisions, long implicit in clinical risk assessment, is made apparent in actuarial prediction.”). 
14 Cf. Mayson, supra note 10, at 557-560 (reserving judgment on the degree of risk that justifies preventive 
detention). This Article does not address the power of courts to detain an accused person who has violated a 
court-imposed condition of release.  
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detention has focused on the shortcomings of current law,15 we take existing law as 
a given. This is not to endorse existing law as representing the best possible policy 
approach to detention. The project, rather, is to take existing legal doctrine 
seriously, and to ask when detention meets the law’s cost-benefit criteria. We 
present a conceptual framework for answering the question, and then a novel 
empirical method for implementing the framework.  
The conceptual framework is a straightforward consequentialist one. 
Constitutional law authorizes pretrial detention when the government’s interest in 
safety “outweighs” the individual’s interest in liberty.16 In order to be justified in 
those terms, pretrial detention must, at minimum, avert more harm than it inflicts. 
The most significant harms at stake are the cost of crime to the potential crime 
victim and the cost of pretrial detention to the detainee. Within this calculus, 
prohibitions against pretrial punishment mean that the well-being of the arrestee 
must be fully taken into account.  The challenge is thus to develop a direct measure 
of the relative harms of incarceration and crime. 
To meet the challenge, the Article deploys a novel form of contingent 
valuation that we call “Rawlsian cost-benefit analysis.”17 It aims to estimate the 
relative harm of incarceration versus crime victimization while avoiding some of 
the distortions that plague traditional cost-benefit and contingent valuation 
methods. Our method is intentionally simple, and echoes John Rawls’ famous 
notion that the principles of justice are those that a rational person would choose 
behind a “veil of ignorance” as to her own traits and position in society.18 Adapting 
his effort to detach normative analysis from self-interest, we conduct a survey that 
requires respondents to compare the costs of detention and crime directly, 
imagining themselves as both detainee and as crime victim. We ask questions like 
“How much time in jail is as bad as being the victim of a burglary?”  and “If you 
15 E.g. Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing 
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1986); Chalmous G. Reemes, United States v. Salerno: The 
Validation of Preventive Detention and the Denial of A Presumed Constitutional Right to Bail, 41 ARK. L. REV. 
697 (1988). 
16 See infra Part I.A-B. 
17 We developed this concept and conducted our first study in 2017, but learned in the spring of 2020 that 
others have used the same method, with very similar terminology, in other contexts. Most notably, the legal 
scholars Jane Bambauer and Andrea Roth are using a similar survey method to estimate when carceral 
punishment becomes “excessive” for constitutional purposes. See infra note 110. Conversations with Bambauer 
and Roth were valuable in refining our approach. We consider the existence of these other efforts to be a 
strength of the present study rather than a weakness. The other studies to have deployed Rawlsian cost-benefit 
analysis have also documented a surprising degree of aversion to incarceration or involuntary commitment 
among a sizable portion of respondents. See infra note 132.   
18 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
2/16/2021
6 
had to choose between spending a month in jail or being the victim of a burglary, 
which would you choose?”19  
The survey results suggest that people view incarceration as an incredibly 
harmful experience. Most would choose crime-victimization over even short jail 
stints. The median respondent says that a single day in jail is as costly as a burglary, 
that three days are as costly as a robbery, and that a month in jail is as costly as an 
aggravated assault. The severity of the harm that incarceration inflicts means that 
preventive detention can only be justified on consequentialist grounds if there is a 
very high risk that the person would otherwise commit serious crime. Jailing a 
person for thirty days is justifiable only if it is expected to prevent crimes at least 
as harmful as a serious assault. Jailing someone for just one day is justifiable only 
if it averts crime as serious as burglary. These risk thresholds are higher than we 
can meet with statistical evidence. In studies of one widely used risk assessment 
tool, for instance, even defendants in the highest risk group have only a 2.5% 
chance of rearrest for a violent offense within a month.20 We would have to detain 
forty such people for one month each, not just one person, to expect to avert one 
violent offense.  
Given the high risk-threshold for preventive detention and the limits of our 
predictive abilities, pretrial detention on the basis of dangerousness should be rare. 
But it is not. On any given day, almost 500,000 people are held in jails awaiting 
trial.21 Many more cycle through pretrial detention each year.22 A significant 
number of these detentions may be the unintentional result of a court setting money 
bail that the accused cannot afford.23 A much smaller number may be justified on 
the basis of flight risk—a ground for detention that this paper does not address.24 
Yet the centrality of public-safety discourse to the growing backlash to bail reform 
efforts demonstrates that crime-risk dwarfs flight-risk, in the view of both courts 
and the public, as a concern in the pretrial phase.25 The focus on crime-risk suggests 
that a substantial portion of the millions of people who cycle through jails each year 
are there because they were perceived to be dangerous. 
19 This method is a variant of the survey technique formally known as “contingent valuation”, which has 
provided most of the commonly used estimates for the costs of crime. See infra notes [x-x] and accompanying 
text.  
20 See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
21 Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2017, fg.1, tbl.3 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2019), 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji17.pdf. 
22  Id. at 1.   
23 E.g. Sandra Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 DUKE L.J. 1643-1680, 1653 (2020) (citing 
statistics regarding detention on money bail). 
24 But see Samuel Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344 
(arguing that detention is rarely necessary to manage flight risk given advancing surveillance technologies). 
25 See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, The Bail Reform Backlash That Has Democrats at War, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/nyregion/new-york-bail-reform.html; see also, e.g., H.R. 81, 




There are many possible explanations for the dramatic gap between theory 
and practice. The most likely, we surmise, is that current practice reflects an 
implicit discounting of the value of detainees’ well-being relative to the well-being 
of potential crime victims. This might be because accused people are viewed as 
criminals who have forfeited the right to liberty; because accused people are 
disproportionately black, brown and poor while the paradigmatic crime victim in 
the public imagination is white and wealthy; because pretrial detention is assumed 
to be credited against legitimate punishment imposed after conviction; or all of the 
above.  
Some of these grounds for discounting the welfare of arrestees are easier to 
dismiss than others. The most difficult ground to dismiss is the idea that arrestees 
are not entitled to the same concern as crime victims because they are not wholly 
innocent; they are in some manner culpable for having created the risk at issue. As 
one of us has written elsewhere, this notion runs headlong into the presumption of 
innocence and prohibition on pretrial punishment, foundational principles of the 
American legal order.26 It is extremely difficult to reconcile those principles with 
the idea that the state can discount the welfare of arrestees on the basis of their 
(probable) guilt. Yet the intuition that the state may treat accused persons as having 
impaired moral status is strong, and in some circumstances it seems unjust not to 
discount an arrestee’s welfare relative to a person the arrestee is credibly alleged to 
have threatened.  
This Article does not resolve the conflict between the prohibition on pretrial 
punishment and the human impulse to discount the welfare of arrestees in a cost-
benefit calculus. Rather, it demonstrates that a rigorous consequentialist analysis 
raises deep questions about how the law ought to value individual liberty and 
welfare, questions that echo across many fields of law. It also demonstrates that, 
left unexamined, consequentialist rationales can mask decision-making processes 
that rely on judgments of worth or are dictated by perverse incentives. Confronting 
these processes will be important to the long-term success of pretrial reform. 
The Article makes four contributions. The first is to fully articulate the 
consequentialist conceptual framework for detention decisions that current law 
entails. The second is the method we devise to apply that framework: Rawlsian 
cost-benefit analysis, which allows for the comparison of intangible harms without 
resort to the distorting intermediary of dollars. The Article’s third contribution is 
the information the survey reveals: Even short periods of jail detention impose 
harms as grave as serious crimes. The logical corollary is that if we value the liberty 
of accused people and crime victims by a common standard, pretrial detention for 
the purpose of preventing crime is almost never warranted on cost-benefit grounds. 
Finally, in illuminating the chasm between the cost-benefit rationale for pretrial 
26 Mayson, supra note 10. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3787018
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detention and our actual practices, the Article highlights the need for policymakers, 
courts, and bail reformers to grapple with the retributive impulse and institutional 
incentives that shape detention practice on the ground.  
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the legal doctrine that 
authorizes pretrial preventive detention on cost-benefit grounds. It extrapolates the 
consequentialist conceptual framework that this doctrine implies, then explains 
why existing empirical methods are inadequate to weigh the harm of criminal 
victimization against the harm of incarceration. Part II presents our Rawlsian cost-
benefit surveys and explains the results. Part III explores the implications of the 
survey results for pretrial policy and beyond. 
I. WHAT DEGREE OF RISK JUSTIFIES DETENTION?
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Constitution authorizes 
pretrial preventive detention when the government’s interest in security outweighs 
the individual’s interest in liberty. This raises the difficult question of when the 
security benefit of detention—averting some potential future harm—does outweigh 
its cost in liberty. How severe must the potential harm be, and how likely to occur 
within a given timespan? The question is of central importance to pretrial policy. 
Unfortunately, neither law nor prior scholarship offers much of an answer. The 
central obstacle has been the difficulty of valuing the intangible harms in the 
balance. 
A. The Governing Law
The Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial punishment.27 This is an 
undisputed precept of American constitutional law. In ordinary speech, both 
citizens and courts sometimes refer to this prohibition as the “presumption of 
innocence,” although technically the presumption is just “a doctrine that allocates 
the burden of proof in criminal trials.”28 In its broader sense, though, the 
presumption stands for the proposition that the state may not subject a person to 
“the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the possibility of 
institutional confinement” except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.29 The state 
may not impose punishment before conviction. In this sense, the presumption of 
innocence is a “bedrock” principle, “axiomatic and elementary,” the enforcement 
of which “lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”30 
27 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 
28 Bell, 441 U.S. at 553.  
29 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970). 
30 Id. (quoting and citing Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). 
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The prohibition on pretrial punishment does not, however, preclude all 
pretrial deprivations of liberty. The government has an important interest in 
ensuring that criminal legal proceedings unfold fairly and promptly. It can limit 
individual liberty as necessary in order to protect that interest, by requiring accused 
people and witnesses to show up for court, by imposing conditions of release, and, 
in some circumstances, by detaining an accused person or witness pending trial.31 
Such detention does not claim justification on the basis of guilt, but rather on the 
basis of a cost-benefit analysis; the state’s interest in ensuring the fair and prompt 
administration of justice simply outweighs the individual’s right to liberty. 
United States v. Salerno tested the government’s authority to detain an 
accused person for a different reason: to prevent the arrestee from committing other 
crime unrelated to the pending charge.32 The petitioners argued that such detention 
for dangerousness constituted pretrial punishment, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed. The Court reasoned that the detention was not intended as punishment. 
The government did not seek to justify the detention by reference to the petitioners’ 
guilt for the offenses charged.33 The government sought to justify the detention, 
instead, solely on the basis of danger. It claimed that, in view of the risk the 
petitioners posed, detention was necessary to protect public welfare.  
Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit had held 
that the government may not detain a person on grounds of dangerousness alone. 
Substantive due process, the Second Circuit held, categorically “prohibits the total 
deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future crimes.”34 The 
Supreme Court rejected that view. It concluded that danger alone may indeed be a 
sufficient basis for pretrial detention, because “the Government’s regulatory 
interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an 
individual’s liberty interest.”35  
Salerno thus appeared to authorize pretrial preventive detention on pure 
cost-benefit—or consequentialist—grounds. To say that detention is permitted 
when the government’s interest in safety “outweighs” an individual’s interest in 
liberty is to say that detention is permitted when the harm the government seeks to 
avert exceeds the harm that detention inflicts on the individual detained. Detention 
is permitted when its benefits exceed its costs.36  If, on the other hand, detention is 
31 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s 
giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.”). 
32 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
33 Id.; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (“In a civil commitment state power is not 
exercised in a punitive sense.”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (holding “that involuntary 
confinement pursuant to the [Kansas Sexually Violent Predator] Act is not punitive”). 
34 United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
35 481 U.S. at 748. 
36 At least in the pretrial context. The Salerno court did not specify whether this reasoning applies to 
people not charged with any crime. 
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an “excessive” response to the state’s concerns, either at the outset or because of its 
duration, the detention becomes punitive and violates due process.37  
Salerno left open the question of when exactly the governmental interest in 
safety does outweigh the individual’s interest in liberty: How dangerous must a 
person be to justify the state in locking her up for the greater good? The Court held 
that the federal preventive detention regime (as it existed in 1987) satisfied due 
process in part because the regime limited detention eligibility to those charged 
with “a specific category of extremely serious offenses” and required the state to 
prove that the individual posed a “demonstrable danger” that could not be managed 
through less intrusive means.38 But the Court offered no further clarity about the 
type and degree of risk that constitutes a sufficient threat in an individual case. 
The other layers of law that govern pretrial detention practice add some 
detail to Salerno’s broad consequentialist framework, but not all that much. In 
federal law, the Bail Reform Act embeds the consequentialist framework that 
Salerno endorsed. As the Court noted, it permits detention only for those charged 
with certain offenses that Congress “specifically found” to denote a threat, and only 
if no condition of release can “reasonably assure” the safety of the community.39 
The implied logic of this scheme is that when a person is charged with an offense 
that indicates special risk and a court determines that the person poses a threat that 
cannot be managed through less intrusive means, the benefit of preventive detention 
outweighs its cost in liberty.  
The implementation of the Act and its evolution over time have undercut its 
consequentialist logic, however. Following the lead of the Senate Report that 
accompanied the Act at its passage, courts have defined “safety” in extremely broad 
terms.40 Congress has gradually expanded the list of detention-eligible offenses, as 
well the circumstances that give rise to a “presumption” of dangerousness.41 And 
the statute never did require the court considering detention to explicitly weigh the 
37 481 U.S. at 747; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). 
38 481 U.S. at 747-50. 
39 Id.; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (e). 
40 S. REP. NO. 98-225, 12-13 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3195-96 (“The language 
referring to the safety of the community refers to the danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity 
to the detriment of the community.”); id. (advising that “safety” should “be given a broader construction than 
merely danger of harm involving physical violence”); id. (“The Committee also emphasizes that the risk that a 
defendant will continue to engage in drug trafficking constitutes a [relevant] danger”); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Kelsey, 82 F. App’x 652, 654 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Mr. Kelsey has demonstrated an inability to stay 
away from drugs and drug-related activity, thereby making him a danger to society.”); United States v. Strong, 
775 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that “Congress intended to equate traffic in drugs with a danger to 
the community”). 
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); see also Hearing on “The Administration of Bail by State and Federal Courts: 
A Call for Reform” Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. of 
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (testimony of Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the 
Federal Criminal Justice Clinic); Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Federal 
Pretrial Detention, 22 Am. Econ. & L. Rev. 24 (2020).  
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benefit of detention against its costs. So although the Bail Reform Act pays lip 
service to consequentialist reasoning, it authorizes a great deal of preventive 
detention without rigorous cost-benefit analysis. As of 2018, federal pretrial 
detention rates were hovering around seventy percent, more than double what they 
were in 1988.42 The federal detention regime does not provide any clarity as to 
when the benefit of detention in fact exceeds its costs. 
One might look to state law for answers, given that many states have 
codified pretrial preventive detention provisions in their constitutions or statutory 
law. But existing state law is not much help either. As one of us recently 
summarized the field: 
Six of the nineteen state constitutional provisions that authorize 
preventive [pretrial] detention condition it on a risk of violence. But 
ten condition it on a vaguely articulated “danger” or the need to 
ensure “safety,” and three do not articulate a severity-of-harm 
threshold at all. State statutory law varies tremendously, but rarely 
provides an explicit severity-of-harm threshold. As for the 
likelihood of harm, most laws mandate restraint if it is necessary to 
“adequately protect” or “reasonably assure” the safety of the 
community.43 
These vague legal standards provide minimal guidance. 
Many states aspire to do better. New Jersey and New Mexico have recently 
enacted new constitutional provisions and statutes governing pretrial detention.44 
Illinois just became the first state to eliminate money bail, which should have the 
effect of limiting pretrial detention to the circumstances in which the Illinois 
Constitution allows it.45 Pretrial reform is slated to appear on legislative agendas 
around the country in 2021. Legislative drafters will look to a handful of models: 
the New Jersey and New Mexico regimes, perhaps now the Illinois regime, the 
42 Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal Pretrial Detention Rate, in Context, 82 FED. PROBATION 13, 
13 (2018). 
43 Mayson, supra note 10, at 561-62. 
44 N.J. CONST. art. 1, ¶ 11 (amended 2017); S.B. No. 946, 2014 NJ Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 31, codified as 
amended at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-15 et seq.; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (amended 2016); N.M. R. CRIM. 
P. DIST. CT. 5-401, 5-409.  California’s legislature passed a comprehensive bail reform statute, but the voters
rejected it by referendum this past November. E.g. Mathew Borges, California Rejects Proposition to End Cash
Bail, Jurist (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/11/california-rejects-proposition-to-end-cash-
bail. New York enacted comprehensive bail reform, but remains alone among the states in prohibiting detention
on the basis of dangerousness. Roxanna Asgarian, The Controversy over New York’s Bail Reform Law,
Explained, Vox.com (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.vox.com/identities/2020/1/17/21068807/new-york-bail-
reform-law-explained.
45 Chicago Council of Lawyers, VICTORY: Illinois Just Passed the Pretrial Fairness Act and Ended 
Money Bail, https://chicagocouncil.org/illinois-just-passed-the-pretrial-fairness-act-and-ended-money-bail/ 
(Jan. 13, 2021); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (permitting detention only for those charged with an offense punishable 
by death, life imprisonment, or mandatory prison time “when the court, after a hearing, determines that release 
of the offender would pose a real and present threat to the physical safety of any person”). 
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federal Bail Reform Act,46 the pretrial detention law of the District of Columbia 
(which has operated well since 1970),47 the Uniform Law Commission’s new 
Pretrial Release and Detention Act,48 and several proposals developed by advocacy 
organizations.49 All of these models share the same structure. They permit detention 
to prevent future crime when the risk is serious and no intervention short of 
detention can adequately reduce it. The implied logic, again, is consequentialist. 
Each regime strives to articulate the conditions under which the benefit of detention 
outweighs its cost in liberty.  
Even these “model” regimes, however, are hazy about what risk is 
sufficiently serious to justify detention. The ULC Act, which is arguably the most 
specific, authorizes detention when a court finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that “it is likely that the individual will abscond, obstruct justice, violate an order 
of protection, or cause significant harm to another person,” or it is “extremely 
likely” that a person charged with a felony will not appear in court, and “no less 
restrictive condition is sufficient to address satisfactorily the relevant risk.”50 The 
Act does not specify what constitutes “significant harm,” what probability of harm 
makes it “likely,” or what degree of risk reduction would address the risk 
“satisfactorily.” Nor does the Act designate specific detention-eligible offenses; it 
leaves that task to states that adopt it.51 
Lastly, one might look to the law governing preventive detention in other 
arenas for help. Pretrial detention is, after all, just one form of preventive detention 
among many.52 Other routine forms of preventive detention include involuntary 
civil commitment,53 material witness detention,54 immigration detention,55 and the 
46 18 U.S.C. § 3142 et seq. 
47 D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1321 et seq. 
48 Pretrial Release and Detention Act, Uniform Law Commission (2020). One of the authors served as 
Associate Reporter for the Act. 
49 Am. Civil Liberties Union, A New Vision for Pretrial Justice in the United States (2019); Civil Rights 
Corps, Pretrial Release and Detention Act (2020); Timothy R. Schnacke, Ctr. For Legal and Evidence-Based 
Practices, “Model” Bail Laws: Re-Drawing the Line between Pretrial Release and Detention (2017); Harvard 
Law Sch. Criminal Justice Policy Program, Bail Reform: A Guide for State and Local Policymakers (2019).  
50 Uniform Law Commission, Pretrial Release and Detention Act § 403 (2020). 
51 See id. § 102(4) and comment.  
52 Accord Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85, 86-87 (2011) (“Preventive detention is not prohibited by U.S. law or especially 
frowned upon in tradition or practice. . . . The federal government and all 50 states together possess a wide 
range of statutory preventive detention regimes that are frequently used, many of which provoke little social or 
legal controversy.”). 
53 Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 PSYCHIATRY 30 (2010); Klein 
& Wittes, supra, at 87 (noting the state’s “protective custody powers, permitting the noncriminal detention—
often for their own protection—of, among others, the intoxicated, alcoholics, drug addicts, the homeless, and 
pregnant drug users”).  
54 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIM. PROC. § 12.4(g) (4th ed. 2004) (“Nearly all states have enacted 
provisions dealing with the pretrial confinement of material witnesses.”). 
55 See, e.g., Frances M. Kreimer, Note, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to Immigration 
Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1485 (2012). 
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detention of juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent.56 Less routinely, the 
state can detain individuals who present a national security threat in wartime.57 And 
as we have all learned, the state can mandate and enforce quarantine to prevent the 
transmission of disease.58 There are important differences across these contexts, but 
the justification for depriving a person of liberty is the same in each: the deprivation 
is necessary to avert some greater harm. The question is what risk is sufficient to 
lock a person up for the greater good.  
The only lesson from this landscape, however, is that the question has 
proven intractable and enduring. Constitutional litigation has led the Supreme 
Court to articulate procedural requirements for detention decisions, but never a 
substantive risk standard.59 Preventive detention statutes are notoriously non-
specific. One treatise synthesizes the “dangerousness” standards in civil 
commitment statutes as follows:  
56 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1967) (summarizing history and objectives of juvenile court 
system, in which “the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather 
than punitive”). 
57 U.S. CONST. art.1 § 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when 
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); Klein & Wittes, supra note 52, at 87. The 
most infamous example of wartime preventive detention in U.S. history was the Japanese internment of World 
War II, upheld by the Supreme Court in two decisions that the Court has quite recently renounced. Hirabayashi 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been
overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’”). Notably,
the Court found the Japanese internment retrospectively unconstitutional because the criterion for detention
was race alone. Id. (“The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on
the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. . . .”).
58 See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Epidemics, Outsiders, and Local Protection: Federalist Theater in the Era of 
Shotgun Quarantine, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 420-22 (2016) (describing the federal government’s 
quarantine authority); Michael R. Ulrich & Wendy K. Mariner, Quarantine and the Federal Role in Epidemics, 
71 S.M.U. L. REV. 391, 398-412 (2018) (discussing the legality of federal quarantine regulations). 
59 In the context of civil commitment, the Court has held that due process prohibits commitment in the 
absence of danger, O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), and requires the state to prove 
“dangerousness” by clear and convincing evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). But it has not 
defined “dangerousness.” See John Monahan & David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in 
Civil Commitment, 2 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 37 (1978) (pointing out the distinction between a procedural standard 
of proof like “clear and convincing evidence” and a substantive “standard of commitment”—the probability of 
harm that justifies a liberty deprivation); Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for 
Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 38 
(describing a standard of proof as “a standard for measuring epistemological uncertainty,” whereas a standard 
of commitment is “a standard for measuring ontological uncertainty”); Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual 
Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 855 (2013) (discussing this distinction further). With respect to “sexually 
violent predators” (SVPs), the Court has not specified what likelihood of a future sex offense over what 
timespan is sufficient to justify detention, nor what type of prospective sex offense is sufficiently severe. See 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (addressing and resolving other 
questions about SVP commitment, but not that one). Quarantine, meanwhile, is uncharted constitutional terrain 
at the Supreme Court. The Court has never determined whether due process sets a risk threshold for involuntary 
sequestration. See Ulrich and Mariner, supra, at 403-23 (arguing that constitutional standards for involuntary 
civil commitment should apply equally to involuntary quarantine).  
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[T]he potential harm must be serious or substantial, but the patient
need not be homicidal. By some authority, the potential harm must
be physical, but, by other authority, emotional injury to others may
be sufficient. Potential harm to property may be sufficient, but there
is contrary authority.60
No standard civil commitment statute specifies the numerical probability of the 
relevant harm occurring within a given timespan that is sufficient to warrant 
confinement.61 Statutes providing for the indefinite commitment of “sexually 
violent predators” are, for the most part, equally vague.62 Most require the 
government to show that that the person at issue is “dangerous;”63 that it is 
“likely”64 or that there is a “high”65 or “substantial”66 risk that he will commit a 
sexual offense if not institutionalized. Although a handful of jurisdictions do 
require a finding that the potential harm is more likely than not (the probability 
exceeds 50%),67 courts in other jurisdictions have explicitly rejected a numerical 
60 56 C.J.S. MENTAL HEALTH § 46 (2019). There is similar variation with respect to the probability and 
imminence of the potential harm that justifies detention. Id.  
61 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 
1240–41 (1974) (“The failure of present commitment standards to indicate what probabilities of various harms 
justify commitment creates the danger that courts will ignore the central question in police power 
commitments—the amount of anticipated social harm required before an individual can be deprived of his 
liberty for a specified period.”); Morris, supra note 71, at 71 (“The statement remains as true today as when it 
was made twenty-five years ago.”). 
62 Around half of the states have enacted such a statute. E.g. Sexually Violent Persons, ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§§ 36–3701 to –3717 (2017); Sexually Violent Predator Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–09 (2014);
Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, FLA. STAT. §§ 394.912–.926 (2010); Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–/99 (2013). So has Congress. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 4248 (2006) (passed as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006); cf. Sexual
Psychopaths Act, D.C. CODE § 22–3803 to –3811 (2012).
63 E.g. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03 (2016) (providing for commitment of those “[l]ikely to be a danger 
to others and to commit sex offenses”); D.C. CODE § 22–3803 (1) (2012) (providing for the commitment of a 
person “who by a course of repeated misconduct in sexual matters has evidenced such lack of power to control 
his or her sexual impulses as to be dangerous to other persons . . .”). 
64 E.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36–3701 (7)(b) (2017); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (2014); FLA.
STAT. § 394.912(10)(b) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §59–29a02(a) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 
(2010); MINN. STAT. 253D.02(16)(3) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71–1201 to –1226 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN § 
30:4–27.26 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25–03.3–01 (8) (2011); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03 (2016); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44–48–30 (9) (2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.003 (a)(2) (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 
37.2–900 (2009). 
65 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:1 (2010).  
66 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33–6-501 (2) (2007). 
67 IOWA CODE § 229.A(2)(5) (2014); MO. REV. STAT. §632.480(5) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 
(7) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) (2016); see also Westerheide v. State, 767 So. 2d 637, 652–3 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App., 2000) (defining “likely” as “having a better chance of existing or occurring than not”); G.H. v. Mental
Health Board (In re G.H.), 781 N.W.2d (2010) (“Medical expert testimony regarding causation based upon




threshold.68 To the authors’ knowledge, no statute or court has articulated a risk 
standard that anchors a numerical probability to a defined time period. 
The vagueness of “danger” standards in the law of preventive detention has 
frustrated scholars for generations. As Eric Janus and Paul Meehl once explained, 
“[d]eveloping quantified measures for the standard of commitment is an essential 
step in assuring that the standard in use is indeed the high standard claimed, and 
that the standard can be enforced and applied fairly and uniformly in the trial and 
appellate process.”69 Many others have echoed the point, urging legislatures and 
courts to specify the magnitude and probability of harm (over a specified timespan) 
that can justify detention in each context.70 With few exceptions, their pleas have 
fallen on deaf ears. 
The state of play, then, is that the Supreme Court has affirmed the 
government’s authority to preventively detain accused people on the basis of 
consequentialist balancing, but neither Supreme Court doctrine nor any other body 
of relevant law offers much guidance about how severe and how likely a potential 
future harm must be in order to justify depriving a person of liberty. Nonetheless, 
preventive detention regimes that invoke consequentialist logic are in operation 
across the country. More will be soon. The question of what risk justifies detention 
is as important as it is daunting. 
B. Conceptual Framework
How should one evaluate when detention is justified in consequentialist 
terms? The subject is shockingly undertheorized.71 This is, in significant part, 
68 People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 972 (Cal. 2002) (“The statute does not require a precise 
determination that the chance of re-offense is better than even . . . the person is “likely” to reoffend if . . . the 
person presents a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, that he or she will commit such 
crimes if free in the community.”); Commonwealth v. Boucher, 880 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Mass. 2002) (“While likely 
indicates more than a mere propensity or possibility, it is not bound to the statistical probability inherent in a 
definition such as ‘more likely than not,’ and the terms are not interchangeable.”); In re Civil Commitment of 
Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014) (“The term ‘likely,’ . . . does not indicate a defined numeric level of certainty 
. . . . We also conclude that ‘highly likely’ cannot be defined by a numeric value.”); cf. People v. Hayes (In re 
Hayes), 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct., 2001) (“We determine that the phrase ‘substantially probable’ in 
the Act also means ‘much more likely than not,’ . . . . However, we emphasize that this definition cannot be 
reduced to a mere mathematical formula or statistical analysis.”). 
69 Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex 
Offender Commitment Proceedings, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 33, 60 (1997).  
70 E.g. Dershowitz, supra note 9; Abhi Raghunathan, Note, “Nothing Else but Mad”: The Hidden Costs 
of Preventive Detention, 100 GEO. L.J. 967 (2012) (lamenting that “for over thirty years, the Court has 
consistently refused to define the term dangerous”); Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 43, at 498; 
Eliot T. Tracz, Mentally Ill, or Mentally Ill and Dangerous? Rethinking Civil Commitments in Minnesota, 40 
MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. 121, 123 (2019) (noting that the Minnesota Treatment and 
Commitment Act “lacks sorely needed definitions of ‘serious physical harm’ as well as ‘dangerous’ that would 
allow district courts . . . to make decisions in a consistent manner”).  
71 Accord Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 59 (“People are confined to prevent predicted harms without any 
systematic effort to decide what kinds of harms warrant preventive confinement; or what degree of likelihood 
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because scholars revolt against it. Most people who write in this realm hold that the 
state may never detain people who are responsible agents solely to prevent future 
crime.72 Salerno rejected that principle and drew a storm of criticism. The bulk of 
legal scholarship on preventive detention since has centered on why Salerno is 
wrong, or on developing theoretical models for preventive detention that invoke 
principles of forfeiture or self-defense in order to avoid resort to Salerno’s frank 
consequentialism.73 But the scholarly hostility has not redrawn the legal landscape. 
Pretrial preventive detention is almost surely here to stay.74 
This Article instead takes Salerno as a starting point and asks when 
detention is justified on consequentialist grounds. This is not to endorse Salerno’s 
cost-benefit framework.75 Rather, we take existing law as a given for now, and 
operate within it, as lawyers do when they make arguments in court.76 The goal is 
to understand when detention is justified according to the rationale that 
governments have proffered for it, and that the Supreme Court has endorsed. 
Even for those who reject a strict consequentialist approach to pretrial 
preventive detention, moreover, the inquiry here is relevant. One might believe that 
preventive detention cannot be justified unless a person has forfeited her right 
against it, for instance. Or one might believe that the most important question is 
should be required; or what duration of preventive confinement should be permitted; or what relationship 
should exist between the harm, the likelihood, or the duration.”); Morris, supra note [x], at 63 (noting that, 
since Dershowitz’s lament, “no jurisprudence of preventive detention has emerged”); Carol S. Steiker, 
Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998) (calling for attention 
to this area). More recently, scholarship on preventive restraint has proliferated, see Mayson, supra note [X], 
at 305 n.13-15 (2015) (surveying literature of the “preventive state”), but very few scholars have attempted to 
identify just what magnitude and likelihood of harm justifies preventive incarceration.  
72 The academic orthodoxy is that a person who threatens harm is either “mad or bad:” The “bad”—people 
who possess agency, and thus responsibility—must be handled through the criminal law. Only the “mad”—
who lack full agency—may be preventively incapacitated. To detain a person solely to prevent some act that is 
within her control, the theory goes, is to deny her agency. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Pre-Trial Detention and the 
Presumption of Innocence, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 125-28 (Andrew Ashworth 
et al. eds., 2013) (explaining that, according to “traditional liberal” principles, “[r]esponsible agents ought to 
be left free to determine their own conduct . . . and are properly liable to coercion only if and when they embark 
on a criminal enterprise”); Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Article on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 113 (1996) (explaining the mad-or-bad principle).
73 See, e.g., See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 15, at 536 (arguing that preventive detention requires a “moral
predicate” of wrongdoing); ALEC WALEN, THE MECHANICS OF CLAIMS AND PERMISSIBLE KILLINGS IN WAR 
(2019); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence, 8 CRIM L. & PHIL. 
505, 515, 523 (2014) (arguing that states may restrain “culpable aggressors” who threaten future harm); 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous 
and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141 (2011); Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: 
Lost Status as a Foundation for a Lost Immunity, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1229, 1240 (2011).  
74 Accord Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1450 (2017) (noting 
that “there is almost universal agreement that bail judges should be engaging in some form of cost-benefit 
analysis”). 
75 For critique of a cost-benefit approach, see, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 15; Bernard E. Harcourt, The 
Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 47 J. LEG. STUD. 419 
(2018). 
76 That is, we operate from a perspective “internal” to existing law. 
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whether pretrial detention policies are justified, given their distributional effects. 
But even scholars who take those positions typically also believes that a given 
instance of detention must produce net benefit to be justified.77 That is: Net social 
benefit is a necessary condition for pure preventive detention, even if not a 
sufficient one.  
To be justified in consequentialist terms, detention must produce net benefit 
both in absolute terms and relative to alternatives. The benefit of detention must 
outweigh its costs. Even if it does, detention is not justified if a less costly 
alternative—supportive therapy, say, or electronic monitoring—would produce 
comparable benefit. Detention is only justified in consequentialist terms if its 
marginal benefit outweighs its marginal cost, relative to alternative interventions.78 
That is: Detention must produce greater net benefit than would electronic 
monitoring, or mental health treatment with supervision, or any other alternative. 
The criterion of marginal net benefit translates loosely into the least-restrictive-
means principle that anchors so many pretrial regimes.79  
For present purposes, however, we bracket the requirement of marginal net 
benefit and focus on the preliminary question of when preventive detention does 
more good than harm. This is a minimum requirement for preventive detention to 
be justified. To determine when detention does more good than harm, one must 
identify the benefits and harms at stake. The primary benefit of detaining a person 
perceived to be dangerous is preventing potential crime. The primary beneficiary is 
the person who would otherwise have been victimized, but avoiding a crime also 
provides indirect benefit to the would-be victim’s family and diffuse benefit by 
improving the community’s sense of security. On the other side of the balance are 
the costs of detention. These costs primarily befall the person deprived of liberty, 
but detention also inflicts indirect and diffuse costs, including hardship to the 
detainee’s family and insecurity or fear of the police in his community. There are 
fiscal costs on both sides of the ledger as well: the costs of policing and prosecution; 
the costs of incarceration. 
The point at which detention averts greater harm than it inflicts is a function 
of (1) the costs of detention, (2) the number and nature of crimes that detention will 
avert, and (3) the costs of those crimes. The analysis is complicated by the fact that 
we can never know in advance who would commit harm if not detained. We can 
77 E.g. Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected 
Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871 (2011).  
78 See also Mayson, Collateral Consequences, supra, at n.102, 325; Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 
supra note 1043, at 563 n.319.  
79 E.g. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (c)(B) (directing courts to release arrestees on condition that they refrain from 
crime, provide a DNA sample, and “subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of 
conditions, that such judicial officer determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required 
and the safety of any other person and the community”).  
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never know the precise number and nature of crimes that a single detention would 
avert. The best we can do is estimate probabilities. This does not make cost-benefit 
analysis of detention impossible. It just means that the risk-threshold at which 
pretrial detention may be justified is based on expected harm.  
By way of illustration, presume that Joe has a 10% likelihood of committing 
car theft if not detained. This is to say that Joe belongs to a group of people within 
which we expect the rate of car theft to be 10%. For this population, we can expect 
ten detentions to avert one car theft.80 With much greater confidence, we can expect 
1000 detentions to avert around 100 car thefts.81 The cost-benefit question is 
whether this tradeoff is worth it. Is car theft more than ten times as costly as each 
detention, such that we are justified in detaining ten people for every theft we avert? 
How much detention should we be willing to inflict to prevent the theft of a car?  
The answer to the question of how much detention we should accept to 
prevent one crime translates into a risk threshold for detention. If car theft is twice 
as costly as one detention, we should accept up to two detentions in order to avert 
one theft. Detaining those with only a 10% chance of stealing a car is not cost-
justified; it would result in ten detentions, not two, for every car theft averted, 
thereby inflicting much more harm than it averts. If car theft is twice as costly as 
detention, as we have been assuming, the risk threshold for detention is 50%. Below 
that threshold, the cost of detention will exceed the averted cost of crime, in 
aggregate. Above it, the reverse is true.82 
A last important point about the consequentialist framework is that, in 
weighing the costs and benefits of detention, there is no apparent basis to discount 
the wellbeing of the potential detainee. An arrested person has not been convicted 
of a crime. As one of us has argued extensively elsewhere, there is no clear ground 
to treat arrested people as having a different moral status, or a lesser right to liberty, 
than anyone else.83 To invoke a person’s culpability as justification for pretrial 
detention would seem to contravene the constitutional prohibition on pretrial 
punishment. The stated rationale for pretrial preventive detention, moreover—the 
80 This statement simplifies complex principles of probability. If one understands the estimate that Joe has 
a 10% probability of stealing a car in frequentist terms, as we have described it in the text, it is simply a 
restatement of the estimate to say that detaining ten people like Joe is projected to avert one car theft. If one 
understands the estimate instead as conveying a quality specific to Joe, then detaining ten people like Joe (each 
of whom had a 10% chance of otherwise stealing a car) might avert anywhere from zero to ten car thefts. Each 
of the detainees might otherwise have stolen a car or might not have. There is a probabilistic distribution across 
those possibilities (from zero to ten thefts averted). It is exceedingly unlikely that ten detentions avert ten thefts. 
The most likely scenario is that they avert one—but it is almost as likely that they avert zero or two. We think 
the proposition that “we can expect to avert one car theft” is a fair layman’s statement of this probabilistic 
distribution of potential outcomes.  
81 By virtue of the “law of large numbers.” See, e.g., MICHEL DEKKING, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 181–190 (2005). 
82 In reality, risk assessment (both clinical and actuarial) typically estimates a person’s likelihood of 
committing various types of crime, rather than specific criminal offenses.  
83 Mayson, supra note 10. 
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one endorsed by Salerno—has nothing to do with culpability for past acts. It is 
forward-looking; the state claims authority to detain on the basis of risk alone. 
Lastly, there is no legal doctrine establishing that a mere accusation of criminal 
conduct reduces a person’s right to liberty.84 Given the prohibition on pretrial 
punishment and the absence of any clear ground for treating arrestees’ well-being 
as less important than other people’s, we assume—for now—that the government 
must value the liberty of an accused person just as it would value anyone else’s 
liberty for cost-benefit purposes. The Article returns to this point in Part III below. 
To summarize: The justification for pretrial preventive detention is the 
consequentialist notion of net social benefit. To be cost-justified, detention must, at 
a minimum, avert greater harm than it inflicts. In other words, detention must be 
expected to avert greater harm in terms of criminal victimization than it inflicts in 
terms of lost liberty. In determining when this is so, there is no reason to value the 
liberty of the putative detainee any differently than yours or mine.  
C. Prior Estimates of the Risk Threshold for Detention
The central obstacle to determining what risk justifies detention is that it is 
thought to be difficult, if not impossible, to weigh the relevant harms—criminal 
victimization and incarceration—against each other. There is little scholarship that 
even makes an attempt. The scholarship that does falls into two categories. The first 
assesses what degree of risk various system actors believe is necessary to justify 
detention, as well as what risk thresholds they apply in practice. The second takes 
a traditional cost-benefit approach, translating both the benefits and costs of 
detention into monetary terms. Both bodies of literature primarily address detention 
in the context of civil commitment, but they are relevant to pretrial preventive 
detention too. 
1. Risk Thresholds in Belief and Practice
Scholars who have opined on the degree of risk that justifies preventive 
detention typically believe that only very high risk should suffice. Steven Morse, 
for instance, has speculated that “[m]ost informed persons would probably agree 
that the ‘correct’ probability [of serious future harm] required for preventive 
detention is . . . in excess of 80%.”85 Grant Morris has argued that “preventive 
detention of an allegedly dangerous mentally disordered person should require a 
ninety percent probability that, in the absence of confinement, . . . violent crime, 
84 Id. at [X]. 
85 Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally 
Disabled, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 74 (1982). 
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suicide or self-inflicted mayhem will occur within six months.”86 Morse and 
Morris, to be clear, are writing about indefinite civil commitment. Even with 
respect to more short-term preventive detention, though, scholars typically 
advocate a high risk-threshold.87 
Judges appear to use lower risk-thresholds in practice. In 2003, John 
Monahan and Eric Silver surveyed twenty-six practicing judges on “the lowest 
likelihood of violence to others” within twenty weeks that they would accept as 
demonstrating “dangerousness” for purposes of short-term civil commitment.”88 A 
majority expressed willingness to commit at a likelihood of 26%. Half the judges 
considered an 8% chance of violence to be sufficient, and three considered a 1% 
chance to be sufficient.89 A 2016 study found that judges believe the risk threshold 
is much higher for indefinite commitment.90 But these beliefs may not translate into 
practice. A 1997 quantitative analysis of indefinite “sexually violent predator” 
commitments in Montana estimated that courts were indefinitely committing 
people with a 30-to-50% likelihood of recidivism.91  
Research on jurors, meanwhile, suggests that ordinary citizens are willing 
to commit a person indefinitely on probabilities of future harm well under 50%. A 
2014 study that simulated civil commitment proceedings found that the simulation-
jurors’ implicit risk thresholds for commitment ranged from a 20% to 40% 
probability of future sexual violence, with a mean of 31%.92 Another 2014 study 
asked 168 actual jurors who had adjudicated sexually-violent-predator commitment 
86 Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking A Dangerous Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 61, 72-77 (1999); see also Mayson, supra note 10, at 56043 (proposing that “nothing less than a 
substantial likelihood of serious violent crime within a six-month span can justify onerous restraints on 
liberty”). 
87 Few, however, have offered a numerical threshold. Christopher Slobogin, for instance, argues that 
preventive detention must be constrained by a “proportionality principle,” which provides that only serious risk 
can justify serious preventive restraint, and a “consistency principle” requiring that the criteria for preventive 
detention be consistent inside and outside the criminal law. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of 
Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003) (“The proportionality principle requires that the degree of 
danger be roughly proportionate to the proposed government intervention.”).  
88 John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk Management, 2 INT’L. J. 
OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH, 1-6 (2003). The participants were required to select among the five risk 
classification groups produced by the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, the lowest of which 
corresponded to a 1% chance of violence within 20 weeks of release and the highest of which corresponded to 
a 76% chance. Id. at 3. 
89 Id. 
90 S. A., Evans, & Salekin, K. L., Salekin, Violence risk communication: What do judges and forensic 
clinicians prefer and understand?, 3 J. OF THREAT ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT 143 (2016) (surveying 127 
forensic clinicians and 192 judges; reporting majority view that 21-52% chance of future violence constitutes 
moderate risk and 53-99% constitutes high risk.). 
91 Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex 
Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (1997) (relying on Minnesota sex offender 
commitment cases and public information about sex offender recidivism and prediction to develop estimates 
for the probability of recidivism among members of the commitment classes). 
92 N. Scurich & D. Krauss (2014), The Presumption of Dangerousness In Sexual Violent Predator 
Commitment Hearings. 13 LAW, PROBABILITY, & RISK 1-12 (2014). 
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trials what probability of a new sex crime was sufficient to demonstrate that such a 
crime was “likely”.93 More than half the jurors thought that a 1% chance was 
sufficient. More than 97% thought that a 25% chance was sufficient.94  
As a whole, this body of research suggests that there is wide variation in 
how individuals interpret terms like “likely”, as well as in the degree of risk that 
people think is sufficient to justify preventive detention. A non-trivial percentage 
of judges and jurors appear willing to commit people indefinitely on quite low 
probabilities of future harm – even if it is more likely than not, or much more likely 
than not, that the harm will not transpire.  
The central limitation of this literature, for our purposes, is that none of it 
reflects an actual cost-benefit analysis. Judges’ and jurors’ beliefs about when civil 
commitment is justified may be colored by a retributivist impulse to punish people 
for bad deeds, bad character, or projected future crime. Study subjects may also be 
influenced by perspective bias, such that they discount the well-being of potential 
detainees to whom they do not relate. Judges’ and jurors’ decisions in practice are 
almost certainly influenced by their incentive to detain, lest a release decision result 
in catastrophic harm. At the other end of the spectrum, scholars who assert high 
risk-thresholds may be operating on the premise that detention cannot be justified 
on pure consequentialist grounds alone. The risk threshold that people believe can 
justify preventive detention, or that they apply in practice, may have little 
connection to the threshold that a robust cost-benefit analysis would produce.  
2. Traditional Cost-Benefit Analysis
The traditional approach to cost-benefit analysis of preventive detention is 
to price the various harms and benefits of detention in dollars, tally them up, and 
then see how much crime detention must avert to be worth the cost. There are two 
significant problems with this approach. The first is that, although there is a long 
literature estimating the dollar-value cost of crime to crime victims, there is almost 
no literature rigorously estimating the dollar-value cost of detention to detainees. 
The second problem is that quantifying everything in dollars can introduce 
distortion.  
The cost-of-crime literature offers a helpful illustration of traditional cost-
benefit methodology.95 Broadly speaking, it uses two methods: contingent 
valuation and jury awards. Contingent valuation studies ask survey respondents 
how much they would pay to avoid or minimize some harm—how much a person 
93 Jefferson C. Knighton & Daniel C. Murrie, How Likely Is “Likely To Reoffend” in Sex Offender Civil 
Commitment Trials?, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 1 (2014). The jurors had participated in fourteen trials in total, 
each of which resulted in a verdict of commitment. 
94 Id. At [PIN].  
95 For an overview see MARK. A.R. KLEIMAN ET AL., MEASURING THE COSTS OF CRIME (NCJRS 2014). 
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would pay, for instance, to reduce the likelihood of a certain crime by 10%. The 
jury-award method exploits damage awards in civil suits against crime perpetrators. 
The average or median damages award for a particular crime type serves as an 
estimate of the cost of that crime to its victim. Both methods have advantages and 
limitations. Contingent valuation studies benefit from broader data, but survey 
answers are purely hypothetical and are shaped by the respondents’ financial status. 
Jury awards are real, but rare—few crime victims bring civil suits—and likely 
skewed toward crimes committed by the wealthy, since wealthy perpetrators are 
the only ones it makes sense to sue.  
The imprecision of these pricing methods produces cost-of-crime estimates 
that vary widely. Three respected estimates for the personal cost of a serious assault, 
for example, are $23,000,96 $89,000,97 and $156,00098 (in 2011 dollars, scaled for 
inflation). Of note, though, there is substantial consistency across the cost-of-crime 
literature in the ordinal ranking of different offenses by cost. While the dollar 
amounts vary, the ordering usually doesn’t: murder is more costly than robbery, 
robbery is more costly than petty theft, and so forth.  
Imprecision aside, the most basic obstacle to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis 
of detention is that there is no reliable estimate of the personal costs of detention.99 
To our knowledge, there is only one prior estimate with respect to pretrial detention, 
derived by Abrams and Rohlfs in 2011.100 Abrams and Rohlfs estimate the value 
of freedom (and the cost of its loss) on the basis of arrested individuals’ willingness 
to pay cash bail. They conclude that the value of ninety days of freedom for the 
average person in their dataset is $1,000, or $11 per day. As they acknowledge, this 
methodology assumes the ability to post money bail. To the extent that people in 
their dataset remained in jail because they had no choice rather than because they 
made a choice, the estimate is skewed low.  
96 Mark A. Cohen, Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime to Victims, 22 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 537, (1988) (derived from jury awards). 
97 Mark A. Cohen And Alex R. Piquero, New Evidence on the Monetary Value of Saving a High Risk 
Youth, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2009) (derived from contingent valuation). 
98 Mark A. Cohen, Roland T. Rust, Sara Steen, & Simon T. Tidd, Willingness-to-Pay for Crime Control 
Programs, 42 Criminology 89 (2004) (derived from contingent valuation). 
99 Accord Yang, supra note 74, at 1419 (“Unfortunately, very few studies have attempted to empirically 
estimate and quantify this loss [of freedom].”). There is a sizable literature exploring the post-release effects 
of incarceration on detainees and the broader public, but it focuses on incarceration imposed as punishment 
after conviction. In that context, it is not clear that the (theoretically) deserved loss of liberty should count as a 
relevant “cost.” When the state seeks to preventively detain someone, on the other hand, the loss of liberty is 
not justified on the basis of desert, and the personal costs of incarceration are a first-order concern. 
100 David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the 
Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750 (2011) (estimating the value of freedom on the basis of 
cash bail data from New Haven jails). 
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One might construct a cost-of-detention estimate on the basis of jury awards 
in wrongful-conviction cases, which have proliferated in recent years.101 But these 
awards vary tremendously from case to case. It is extremely difficult, moreover, to 
separate out the extent to which the awards compensate victims for the stigma of 
having been wrongfully branded a criminal versus for the liberty deprivation per 
se.102 Still, one scholar, Frederick Vars, has used the lowest award in the sample he 
considered as a measure of the value of liberty: $68,045 for one year.103 
Notwithstanding the dearth of research on the personal costs of detention, a 
few scholars have undertaken cost-benefit analyses of preventive detention by 
traditional means. Vars, analyzing sexually-violent-predator commitment, 
concludes that “the minimum likelihood of future sexual violence within five years 
that should be required for a five-year commitment” is 75%.104 Shima Baradaran 
Baughman, analyzing pretrial detention, finds that the average cost of detention 
outweighs the average benefit by a factor of two.105 She further concludes that 
detention would have produced net benefit for approximately 30% of the 
individuals in her data, and that courts could profitably detain 28% fewer people if 
they made release decisions on the basis of actuarial risk.106 Crystal Yang, 
incorporating “the best available evidence on both the costs and benefits of 
[pretrial] detention,” finds that “on the margin, pre-trial detention imposes far larger 
costs than benefits.”107 Her findings relate to the “marginal” defendant, who some 
bail judges in her datasets would release and others would detain.108 Yang notes the 
limitations of existing data on the costs and benefits of detention, especially the 
cost of detention to detainees; like Baughman, she uses the Rolfs & Abrams 
estimate of $11/day.109   
101 See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS.
L. REV. 35, 114 n.32, n.63 (2005) (reporting recent awards).
102 If practicable, we may attempt a synthesis of such awards nonetheless during further editing of this
piece. 
103 Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 855, 889 (2013). 
104 Id. at 391.   
105 Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2017). Baughman 
estimates the relative costs of pretrial detention and release by tabulating a long list of costs on both sides of 
the equation, including the cost of lost liberty to the detainee (taken from Abram & Rohlfs), the personal costs 
of crime victimization (taken from the studies discussed above), and the taxpayer expenses of administering 
jails and courts. Id. at 4-16. Perhaps because of the limitations of the Abrams & Rohlfs estimate, Baughman 
adds a number of other costs to the “personal costs” borne by the detainee, including lost employment, lost 
property and childcare expenses. Id. at 16-17. 
106 Id. at 19-30. Baughman’s analysis is based on “134,767 randomly selected felony-arrest cases between 
1990 and 2006” from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ “State Court Processing Statistics” data on felony 
prosecutions in the nation’s seventy-five largest jurisdictions. Id. at 10 n.46 and accompanying text. 
107 Yang, supra note 74. Yang uses data from Miami and Philadelphia and draws on her own prior work 
estimating the casual effect of detention on case outcomes, future employment, and future interaction with the 
criminal justice system.  
108 Id. at 1414-36. 
109 Id. at 1419.  
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These cost-benefit analyses, although valiant, rely heavily on the dubious 
translation of intangible costs—liberty deprivation and criminal victimization—
into monetary terms. This is the second major limitation of traditional cost-benefit 
analysis. Money is an unstable metric. Its value depends on its context and the 
situation of the person who possesses it. Converting the harms of both crime and 
incarceration into dollar amounts in order to compare them introduces unnecessary 
noise into the comparison. It can also introduce bias. If the costs of incarceration 
are quantified on a group of people for whom money is very dear—the poor—while 
the costs of crime are quantified using wealthier respondents, the scale is tilted.  
II. RAWLSIAN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
We were sitting in the office one day, discussing the difficulty of 
determining when detention produces net benefit, when one of us asked: “Well, 
how long would you sit in jail to avoid getting robbed?” It struck both of us as a 
provocative question. We wanted to know what other people thought. We decided 
to ask. Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online platform that enables hiring 
people to perform short tasks, we surveyed roughly 900 respondents on the amount 
of time they would be willing to spend in jail rather than be the victim of various 
crimes. We called our unconventional survey method “Rawlsian cost-benefit 
analysis.” Over the course of the project, we learned that a few other scholars have 
independently arrived at the same methodology—some with the same Rawlsian 
terminology!110 Most recently, legal scholars Jane Bambauer and Andrea Roth have 
used a similar method to estimate when carceral punishment becomes “excessive” 
for constitutional purposes.111 To our knowledge, no other scholar has yet applied 
it to pretrial detention. We thus present our study as an exemplar of a novel 
empirical technique that is gaining academic currency, applied in a context to which 
it is particularly well suited: determining when preventive detention averts greater 
harm than it inflicts.  
110 Jane Bambauer & Andrea Roth, Measuring “Grossly Excessive” Punishment (work in progress; 
manuscript on file with authors) (using a Rawlsian cost-benefit survey to assess the relative harm of crime 
victimization and incarceration in order to determine when punishment is “grossly excessive”); Douglas 
Mossman & Kathleen J. Hart, How Bad Is Civil Commitment? A Study of Attitudes Toward Violence and 
Involuntary Hospitalization, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 181 (1993) (survey study asking 
undergraduate and medical students whether they would prefer to be attacked by a man with a knife or spend 
a certain amount of time as a patient in a state psychiatric hospital, in order to elicit policy preferences from 
Rawls’ “initial position”); Nicolas Scurich, Criminal Justice Policy Preferences: Blackstone Ratios and the 
Veil of Ignorance, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 23 (2015) (survey study eliciting the relative cost that 
respondents assigned to a wrongful conviction for assault versus being the victim of an assault “beneath a 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance”). The technique also bears a loose kinship to Paul Robinson’s survey research on 
“empirical desert.” See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 114; Robinson et. al., supra note 114. The other 
three studies to deploy a Rawlsian cost-benefit survey found results quite similar to ours. See infra note 132. 




Our method presumes that there are two costs in the preventive detention 
calculus that swamp all the others. The first is the cost of crime to the crime victim. 
The second is the cost of detention to the detainee. If we can weigh these costs 
against one another, we can develop rough but useful estimates of the risk threshold 
at which pretrial preventive detention could be cost-justified. In other words, we 
posit that, to be cost-justified, detention must—at a minimum—avert greater harm 
to crime victims than it inflicts on detainees. This is an admittedly reductive 
formula. Yet we think that it captures the core tradeoff that preventive detention 
entails. We detain, at great personal cost to the detainee, to avoid harmful acts, 
primarily in the interest of those who would be harmed. Our survey method requires 
respondents to compare these two central harms directly against each other.  
Asking respondents to compare detention against criminal victimization has 
two advantages over traditional contingent-valuation surveys. First, it avoids the 
need to quantify each harm in dollars. As noted above, the cost-of-crime literature 
demonstrates that people give widely divergent answers when asked to price some 
experience in monetary terms.112 On the other hand, people give highly consistent 
answers when asked to rank different experiences in terms of personal cost.113 Paul 
Robinson’s “empirical desert” surveys have documented similar patterns: there is 
no consensus among respondents about the appropriate sentence for any given 
offense, but respondents rank offenses by severity quite consistently.114 This 
phenomenon suggests that asking people to compare the experiences of crime and 
jail against each other is likely to produce more meaningful information than asking 
people to quantify the harm of each experience independently.  
The second advantage of the method is that it requires people to imagine 
themselves experiencing both types of harms. This avoids the danger that the cost 
assessor might discount a harm because, consciously or unconsciously, she 
imagines it befalling only a vague and unappealing other. If we asked people to rate 
the harms of incarceration in more abstract terms, they might imagine the 
incarcerated person as Black, Brown and/or poor. They might imagine that this 
person had committed some sort of crime. It would be difficult to disentangle the 
respondents’ judgments about the harm of incarceration from their race or class 
bias, let alone their judgments about culpability and desert. 
By asking people to imagine themselves in different situations, our survey 
operates on the same logic as John Rawls’ theory of justice. Rawls famously posited 
112 See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text. 
114 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice 
Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Paul H. Robinson et. al., Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and 
Limiting Retributivism: A Reply, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 312 (2014).   
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that just social policy is that which a person would adopt in the “original position,” 
where “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor 
does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence and strength, and the like.”115 Our survey method does not place 
respondents behind the figurative “veil of ignorance,” but it does, like Rawls, aspire 
to detach normative analysis from self-interest by having respondents imagine 
themselves as both crime victim and detainee.   
An observant reader will note that our survey is actually a form of 
contingent valuation. Traditional contingent valuation studies ask people how much 
they would pay to avoid crime victimization, or to reduce the probability of being 
victimized by a certain amount. Our survey differs only in that it asks respondents 
to “price” crime victimization in jail days rather than dollars. 
Finally, some readers may wonder why we should query lay people about 
the relative costs of crime victimization and jail detention rather than some set of 
experts—criminal justice system experts, say, or economists with expertise in cost-
benefit analysis.116 The answer is that it is precisely the judgments of lay people 
that matter. What we need to understand, in order to determine when the benefit of 
detention outweighs is cost, is how bad the experience of crime victimization is 
relative to the experience of jail detention. And those costs are a function of the 
subjective experience of ordinary people. Experts have no special purchase on how 
awful it is to suffer incarceration or be the victim of a crime. The one group that 
might have particular insight are those who have actually experienced these harms. 
We break out the responses of that group in our results and discuss them below. 
B. The Surveys
To implement the Rawlsian cost-benefit analysis, we conducted an online 
survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We conducted three separate surveys to 
price incarceration against three serious crimes: robbery, burglary and aggravated 
assault. (Since the term “aggravated assault” may not be familiar to a lay audience, 
we use the term “serious assault” instead.) The three surveys are identical except 
for the crime names and definitions. We use the survey on robbery as an example 
in this section.117 
Each survey has three parts. The first part asks participants to envision the 
experiences of incarceration and crime-victimization. The primary purpose of this 
section is to ensure that respondents have thought carefully about both experiences, 
making them salient for the purposes of comparison. We refer to these as our 
115 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (2D ED., 1999). 
116 This is a question we have repeatedly fielded. 
117 Note to law review editors: We considered including the survey instrument itself as an Appendix but 
did not because of its length. We are happy to include it for publication if you wish. 
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“priming” questions, and they are presented below (the order is randomized in the 
survey):118 
For each offense, we provide the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) definition 
in parentheses.119 We also provide a few narrowing stipulations. For robbery, we 
stipulate that no one gets seriously injured. (A robbery in which someone gets 
seriously injured would effectively be two offenses: robbery and aggravated 
assault.) For serious assault, we stipulate that no one dies and that the assault is not 
so grave as to amount to attempted murder. (Otherwise the offense would be murder 
or attempted murder, not aggravated assault.) For burglary, we specify that no one 
is home at the time the burglary takes place. (The residents are not home for the 
large majority of residential burglaries; in addition, we wanted at least one offense 
with no face-to-face contact with the perpetrator.)  
118 A reader who is interested in taking the survey herself may do so at the following links for burglary, 
robbery, and serious assault, respectively. https://virginia.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bPoQ8VfJ6tZVdXf, 
https://virginia.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_4GXgcbe1aS7sL5P, 
https://virginia.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_8BVHkIaG86DBxAN.  
119 The UCR definition of aggravated assault is “an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the 
purposes of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury” and the UCR definition of burglary is “the unlawful 
entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft”. See https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm. 
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The second part is the survey core. We begin by asking respondents to make 
a binary choice between two unpleasant experiences: being the victim of a crime or 
spending a certain amount of time in jail. The amount of time is randomized 
between three options: one week, one month, or three months.120 Below is an 
example: 
 If the respondent chooses jail time over the robbery, they are presented with 
a second binary-choice option where the amount of time is randomly selected to be 
either six months, one year or five years. However, if the respondent chooses the 
robbery over jail, their next binary-choice option has shorter jail times: one hour, 
one day or three days. For example:  
These binary-choice questions are designed to be useful stepping-stones on 
the way to our ultimate question: how much jail time is equivalent, in terms of 
harm, to a robbery? We expect the binary questions to be easier to answer than the 
more open-ended question. They also might help resolve potential doubts about 
whether the two types of harms can be meaningfully compared. For instance, 
virtually all of our respondents reported that they would choose burglary over five 
years in jail. And virtually all of our respondents reported that they would choose 
one hour in jail over robbery. At least in these extreme examples, respondents can 
easily and consistently choose between options.  
Once the participants have completed two binary-choice questions, they 
confront the main question of our survey: 
120 The time periods were based on the distribution of responses in a test survey. 
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Following this question, we ask participants to provide a brief one-or-two sentence 
explanation of their answer. This is mostly for diagnostic purposes, to evaluate 
whether respondents have read and understood the question.  
Part three of the survey collects background information. We ask whether 
the participant or anyone close to them has ever been a victim of a robbery or spent 
time in jail or prison. We also collect demographic information: age, race, ethnicity, 
income, and education. 
We used three methods to filter out survey responses that do not reflect a 
good-faith effort to answer the questions.121 First, we dropped any respondent who 
left the two initial priming questions blank or wrote something non-responsive. 
Second, we dropped any respondent who was inconsistent across the binary-choice 
questions and the open-answer question. An inconsistent respondent would, for 
example, choose robbery over one week in jail but then state that robbery was as 
bad as six months in jail.122 Third, we dropped anyone whose explanation for their 
final answer demonstrated that they had misinterpreted the question to ask how 
much punishment was warranted for the crime in question.123 Since the first and 
third attention check entail some subjectivity, we asked two research assistants to 
read the survey responses, and dropped only those responses that both research 
assistants flagged for removal. Dropping these responses changes the distribution 
of results somewhat but does not qualitatively affect the main takeaway from our 
study. Appendix A includes examples of dropped responses. 
121 Studies commonly insert an “attention check” question whose sole purpose is to verify that respondents 
are reading the prompts. 
122 More formally, inconsistency is defined as choosing crime-victimization over a certain amount of jail 
time in one of the binary choice questions, but then stating that crime-victimization is equally as bad as a longer 
period of time. 
123 The survey we describe here is the result of several rounds of iteration. Our first survey was conducted 
in 2016, also on Mechanical Turk. It was similar to this one in structure, and the results were similar as well. 
In our second round, we appended a single question – the open answer question that asks how much time is 
equally as bad as crime victimization – to a survey that was implemented by RAND. Our goal was to reach a 
nationally representative sample, but ultimately we think this iteration was not a success. Our question wound 
up sandwiched in between a series of questions on dental hygiene. Without the priming and binary choice 
questions described above, we could not feel confident that the respondents were giving our question the 
consideration we wanted them to, particularly when it came after such unrelated material. Furthermore, without 
the priming and binary choice questions we no longer had an attention check that allowed us to drop results 




We collected responses until we had a sample of about 300 respondents per 
offense type after dropping those who had failed the attention check.124 Table 1 
shows responses to our primary survey question. The mode is the most common 
response; the 25th percentile is defined so that 25% of responses are less than or 
equal to it; the 50th percentile is the middle response, also known as the median, 
and so forth.  
More than half of respondents stated that a single day in jail would be as 
bad as being the victim of a burglary, and more than half of respondents stated that 
three days in jail are as bad being the victim of a robbery. When asked to explain 
this response, many people noted that, however unpleasant, a robbery or burglary 
occurs quickly and is over. For example, one respondent stated “In jail I lose all my 
freedom and have to live with some very bad and dangerous people. Robberies are 
usually fast crimes so they are over quickly.” People were more averse to the idea 
of being the victim of a serious assault than a robbery or burglary. Nonetheless, 
more than half of respondents thought that a month in jail caused harms at least as 
grave as a serious assault.125 As one respondent wrote, “The isolation and loneliness 
of being in jail for 1 month would become unbearable.” Some respondents also 
noted that incarceration could also lead to an assault: “While being assaulted would 
have serious consequences, being in jail for any length of time may result in more 
than one serious assault.”126 The most common response, across all three offense 
categories, was that a single day in jail would be as bad as or worse than being the 
victim of a crime. 
Table 1: Distribution of Responses to the Question  
“How Much Time in Jail is as Bad as Being the Victim of a [Crime]?” 
Assault Robbery Burglary 
10th percentile 1 day 1 hour 1 hour 
25th percentile 5 days 6 hours 5 hours 
124 Each respondent was only permitted to complete a single survey. 
125 Although the purpose of our study is not to produce dollar-value estimates of the liberty cost of 
detention, we note that it is simple to convert our estimates into dollar-value terms, given the existing 
economics literature estimating the cost of crime victimization in dollars. We can combine our contingent 
valuation results with the cost-of-crime estimates from prior literature to generate monetary estimates of the 
cost of detention for the detainee. For example, the median respondent says that a month in jail is equivalent to 
a serious assault. The median estimate of the cost of serious assault is $89,250. Our survey thus suggests that 
one month of jail has a personal cost to the detainee of $89,250. Needless to say, this is considerably higher 
than the Abrams & Rolfs estimate of $1,000 for ninety days.  
126 If we included the respondents who failed to the attention check, the median response would be two 
months for serious assault, three days for burglary, and seven days for robbery. 
2/16/2021
31 
50th percentile 1 month 3 days 1 day 
75th percentile 6 months 2 weeks 1 week 
90th percentile 3.5 years 1 month 2 months 
Mode127 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 297 290 321 
Although most respondents selected relatively short lengths of time, a few 
report crime-equivalent jail times that are many times longer than the median 
respondent. This may simply be due to noise: despite our attention checks, some 
people are responding thoughtlessly, or are answering a different question. For 
instance, one respondent who reported having been the victim of a serious assault 
said that being the victim of a serious assault was equally as bad as spending 99 
years in jail. When asked to explain this response, she said “A victim of assault 
with live (sic) this problem for the rest of their lives.” It is possible that she believes 
that spending the rest of one’s life in jail is preferable to having to live with the 
aftermath of a serious assault. But it is also possible that her answer was simply 
another way of saying “it was really bad”, or “I think people who assault others 
should be punished harshly”. 
Some variation in responses is to be expected, but variation would be 
particularly important if it demonstrated systematically different views among 
those who have actually experienced incarceration or crime-victimization, and so 
are better informed about their costs. Table 2 breaks the responses out by subgroup, 
including those who have personal experience with either crime victimization or 
incarceration.128  
Table 2: Responses by Subgroup 
Assault Robbery Burglary 
Respondents experienced with crime victimization 
Median 1 month 3 days 1 day 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 86 130 157 
Respondents experienced with incarceration 
Median 1 month 3 days 1 day 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 101 117 118 
Black respondents 
127 In calculating the mode, we round each response up to the nearest day. 
128 “Experienced with crime victimization” means that either the respondent or someone close to them has 
been the victim of the type of crime that is the focus of their survey (assault, robbery, or burglary). “Experienced 
with incarceration” means that either the respondent or someone close to them has spent time in jail or prison. 
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Median 3 weeks 3 days 1 day 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 36 25 30 
White respondents 
Median 1 month 3 days 1 day 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 231 224 255 
Female respondents 
Median 1 month 2 days 1 day 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 126 112 168 
Male respondents 
Median 1 month 3 days 1.75 days 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 170 173 152 
Employed respondents 
Median 1 month 3 days 1 day 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 263 248 279 
Unemployed respondents 
Median 6 months 3 days 2 days 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 21 30 31 
College graduates 
Median 1 month 2 days 1 day 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 181 165 206 
Respondents with no college degree 
Median 1 month 5 days 3 days 
Mode 1 day 1 day 1 day 
# of responses 116 125 115 
Both the median and the modal responses for experienced respondents are 
exactly identical to the full sample. There is no evidence that evaluations of the 
relative harms of crime victimization and incarceration are meaningfully different 
for those who have first-hand experience, compared to those who do not. Responses 
are also remarkably similar across race, gender, employment and education status. 
Respondents who are unemployed or lack a college degree tend to be slightly less 
averse to incarceration relative to crime victimization, but the differences are not 
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substantial.129 This helps ease concern about the Mechanical Turk sample being 
nonrepresentative.130 If responses are consistent across demographic groups within 
our study, then we expect them to be relatively consistent across groups outside of 
our study too. 
D. The Risk Threshold for Pretrial Detention
Translating the survey responses into a risk threshold for pretrial detention 
requires just a few more steps. First, we need to select a metric to summarize the 
distribution of responses. The two logical candidates are the mean and the median. 
The mean is not ideal because it is easily skewed by outlier responses; if a single 
respondent said that burglary was equivalent to 1000 years in jail this would 
dramatically inflate the mean. The median, on the other hand, is not affected by 
extreme outliers. Another advantage of the median is that it is very close to the 
modal response for robbery and burglary. Therefore, it not only captures the 
“middle” response, but also is close to the most frequent response for those crime 
types.  
Taking the median respondent as our metric, one month of detention 
imposes harms as grave as serious assault. Three days of detention imposes harms 
as grave as robbery. And even a single day of detention imposes harms as grave as 
burglary.  We can now evaluate what type of risk might justify pretrial detention. 
If we detain those with a 50% chance of committing serious assault within 
a month for one month each, we sacrifice two months of liberty for every serious 
assault we expect to prevent. On the basis of our median respondent, that tradeoff 
is not cost-justified. Detention might be justified, however, for someone with a 50% 
chance of committing serious assault within the next two weeks, if we limited 
detention to two weeks. In that case, we would sacrifice only 30 days of liberty for 
every averted assault. A 50% chance of committing a serious assault within two 
weeks is thus one way of describing the risk-threshold for pretrial detention: only 
those whose risk of serious assault is higher than 50% within two weeks could 
possibly be detained with net benefit. 
As a reminder, the risk-threshold is only a lower bound on the risk level that 
justifies detention in consequentialist terms. Within the consequentialist 
129 The one instance in which the median response is substantially different is for unemployed people 
answering the serious assault survey. However, this sub-sample is small and the difference is not statistically 
significant using quantile regression. 
130 In terms of race and ethnicity, our respondents are not too dissimilar from the US population. Our 
respondents are 72% White, 10% Black, and 7% Hispanic. In contrast, the US population is 69% White, 12% 
Black, and 12% Hispanic (U.S. Census Bureau). They are, however, slightly more likely to be male (55%) and 
young. The median age was 36 and only 5% of our sample was older than 65. They also report being more 
educated than the average adult: 62% report being a college graduate, compared to 36% of the adult population 
in the United States. 
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framework, those whose risk is below the threshold should never be detained. 
Those whose risk is above it are candidates for detention, but detention is still not 
necessarily cost-justified. First, detention is not cost-justified if less-restrictive 
alternatives can produce comparable or greater net benefit by sufficiently reducing 
the risk of crime at lower cost to liberty. Second, the early days of incarceration are 
likely to impose the most serious costs, due both to the psychological adjustment 
as well as to the disruption to employment, housing status, childcare arrangements, 
and other life circumstances. Detaining two different people for two weeks each 
likely creates graver harms than detaining a single person for one month—and 
therefore greater harms than the serious assault that it is expected to avert.  
Even as a lower bound, though, the risk threshold that emerges from the 
Rawlsian cost-benefit survey is very high. Someone who is expected to commit 
crimes as grave as serious assault within thirty days, crimes as grave as robbery 
within three days, or crimes as grave as burglary within a single day, is 
extraordinarily high-risk. As discussed in Part III, it is extremely difficult to identify 
people who pose that degree of risk. If the justification for pretrial preventive 
detention really is a matter of consequentialist harm-balancing, such detention is 
rarely justified.131 
The extremity of this risk threshold is a function of just how awful—how 
costly—people believe it is to go to jail.132 To be jailed is to lose one’s freedom and 
dignity. It is to be isolated from family and friends. And contemporary American 
jails are not pleasant places. They are rife with violence and disease, quotidian 
humiliation and pervasive fear. Whereas a crime victim has at least the sympathy 
of family, neighbors and employers, a jail detainee must endure their anger and 
distrust. A person hospitalized with injury can still communicate freely with the 
outside world. Not so a person in jail, which is one reason that even a few days in 
131 Not only is detention unjustified according to Salerno’s consequentialist framework if the harm to 
liberty outweighs the benefit in security; it might veer into pretrial punishment. The Supreme Court has held 
that a pretrial deprivation of liberty becomes punishment when it is “excessive” in relation to the goal that it 
seeks to achieve. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). 
If detention inflicts more harm than it averts, it is arguably excessive in relation to its goal of preventing harm. 
Cf. Bambauer & Roth, supra note 110 (arguing that punishment that inflicts more than ten times the harm of 
the crime for which it is imposed is “grossly excessive” for constitutional purposes).  
132 Interestingly, the other studies to have deployed Rawlsian cost-benefit surveys have found similar 
results. [Add results from Bambauer & Roth.] Mossman and Hart were surprised to learn that “over a fourth of 
the undergraduates expressed an implicit preference for being attacked over undergoing a three-day 
hospitalization in a public psychiatric facility,” and that the medical students’ “aversion to involuntary 
hospitalization was nearly as great as the undergraduates’.” Mossman & Hart, supra note 110, at 193. Scurich 
found that 75% of participants would rather be violently assaulted than convicted of violent assault. Scurich, 
supra note 110, at 29. Among that group, the median respondent equated five false negatives with one false 
positive, which Scurich interprets to mean that they “prefer to be violently assaulted 5 times than spend a single 
day in prison.” Id. at 30-31. Even among respondents who would prefer to be convicted of violent assault over 
being assaulted, the median respondent “would prefer to spend 30 days in prison than be violently assaulted”—
but presumably prefer victimization over longer periods of incarceration. Id. at 31.   
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jail can cost a person his job, housing, and custody of his children.133134 In abstract 
policy discussions it is easy to forget just how terrible a cost the system inflicts 
when it puts a person in jail. To our survey respondents, this cost was very vivid.   
E. Technical Objections
We do not present the Rawlsian cost-benefit analysis as the final answer to 
the question of what risk justifies pretrial preventive detention. We offer it instead 
as a proof of concept. One can, in a principled fashion, develop estimates of the 
risk-threshold for pretrial preventive detention. The harms of crime victimization 
and incarceration may be different, but they are not incommensurable. Unless we 
want to leave this calculus in the hands of bail judges and risk-assessment tool 
developers, such analysis must be done, and can be done. We believe, moreover, 
that our survey yields estimates that are ballpark-correct. Granted, the method 
intentionally simplifies a complicated determination. One can raise numerous 
sensible objections to it. We do not think, however, that any of these objections 
fundamentally changes the central takeaway. We discuss technical objections to the 
method below—claims that we have omitted or miscalculated relevant costs and 
benefits. We consider objections to our consequentialist framework in Part III. 
1. Omitted Costs
Perhaps the most obvious potential objection is that the survey method 
ignores manifold costs on both sides of the detention balance: the harms that crimes 
inflict, indirectly, on victims’ families and communities, as well as perpetrators’ 
families and communities; and the similar harms that incarceration inflicts. As 
noted above, however, we expect such costs to exist on both sides of the balance. 
Crime harms the loved ones of those who suffer it; so does detention. Crime can 
increase fear and lead members of the community to invest in precautionary 
measures, even those who have not been directly victimized. But pretrial detention 
can also foment fear, and lead members of the community to take costly 
precautionary measures to avoid interaction with police that might lead to arrest. 
Both crime and incarceration impose indirect costs on taxpayers. And so forth. We 
133 See, e.g., Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Unable to post his bail, Curry . . . . 
missed the birth of his only child, lost his job, and feared losing his home and vehicle. Ultimately, he pled nolo 
contendere in order to return home.”); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y.Times Mag. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1INtghe (reporting the story of a woman who, “five months after her arrest, . . . was still fighting 
in family court to regain custody of her daughter”). 
134
 Our empirical results also support arguments that arrest is overused. Arrest is the initial detention 
decision and can often lead to a day or two in jail before the bail hearing. Given that a single day in jail 
produces harms as grave as being the victim of a burglary, arrest requires substantial justification. Rachel 
Harmon, Why Arrest? 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307 (2016). 
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see no reason to expect that incorporating additional costs would shift the scale 
dramatically in either direction.  
A related objection is that the Rawlsian cost-benefit analysis prioritizes 
individual welfare costs over social welfare costs, and the response is similar. As 
the survey responses illustrate, most respondents contemplated potential harm to 
their careers and loved ones as they weighed the harm of criminal victimization 
against the harm of incarceration. In this sense, the Rawlsian analysis does account 
for some social welfare costs. To the extent that the respondents’ assessments failed 
to take into account broader social harms, we expect those harms to accrue roughly 
equally on both sides of the balance.  
2. Underspecified Harm
A second objection might be that the scenarios we ask each participant to 
envision are underspecified. Does robbery include a gun pointed at your head? 
Does aggravated assault result in permanent disability or disfigurement? We do not 
say. It is therefore possible that different participants are envisioning fundamentally 
different events. 
The decision to leave the details of detention and crime largely unspecified 
was intentional, however, and we see this as a strength rather than a weakness of 
the survey design. The possible variation among the experiences that our 
respondents envision is a useful reflection of reality. Crime victimization and 
incarceration each encompass a wide range of experiences. No two assaults are 
alike. We do not attempt to describe a “median” instance of serious assault or 
incarceration because it does not exist. Our method relies on the virtues of 
aggregation. We expect that the participants’ responses reflect a variety of 
experiences and perspectives. The median response should capture a median 
perspective within that range.  
3. Distorting Perceptions about Justice
A third potential objection is that, when considering the harms of 
incarceration, respondents may be considering the justice of that experience in ways 
that distort their responses. For instance, a respondent might imagine that she is 
being detained wrongfully or irrationally, and perceive that injustice to compound 
the costs of incarceration. Alternatively, a respondent might imagine that she must 
have committed some crime to warrant the incarceration, and perceive the justice 
of her detention to mitigate its cost.  
As an empirical matter, respondents did not frequently report such 
assumptions when describing the challenges of jail time or explaining their 
responses. A few did, but by far the most frequently reported factors in respondents’ 
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deliberations were isolation, danger, stigma, uncomfortable living conditions, 
separation from family, exposure to other inmates, and job loss. If assumptions 
about the justice or injustice of the detention did affect responses, they do not 
appear to have affected responses very much. On a conceptual level, moreover, it 
is not clear that respondents’ assumptions about the justice or injustice of their 
detention should be understood as distorting. Detainees, after all, also perceive their 
detention to be just or unjust, and that perception affects their experience. Absent 
some indication that respondents’ perceptions about the justice of their detention 
differ systematically from detainees’, such perceptions should be included in 
assessing the costs of detention.  
4. Jail is Less Bad for the Average Detainee
A last objection might be that jail is less bad for the average pretrial detainee 
than the median person, if pretrial detainees are more accustomed to life disruptions 
or more in need of food and a place to sleep. A principled cost-benefit analysis, the 
argument goes, should faithfully weigh the liberty loss on an individualized basis, 
accounting for the subjective experience of the deprivation.  
Authorizing the state to incarcerate certain people for longer than others 
because their poverty makes incarceration relatively less awful raises thorny legal 
and moral questions. Principles of equality probably prohibit the state from 
tailoring the pretrial detention decision in this way.135 Allowing otherwise would 
open the door to race and class bias. Moreover, the survey results produce no 
evidence that the harm of incarceration varies substantially by race, class, or prior 
experience with incarceration.136 Respondents who are unemployed, Black, or 
previously incarcerated also report high levels of aversion to spending even a short 
amount of time in jail.  
III. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
The very high risk-threshold that emerges from the Rawlsian cost-benefit 
survey raises two core questions. The first is when, if ever, we can identify risk that 
is grave enough to warrant detention under the survey-derived standard. The second 
is whether our basic premise—that the consequentialist analysis must not discount 
135 In fact, some might argue that we should raise the risk threshold for disadvantaged groups in order to 
wind down disparities within the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic 
Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1131 (2019) (arguing that, where preventive coercion by law enforcement 
aims to prevent “less serious crime,” “the existence of negative spillovers for black families and communities 
warrants a more stringent risk threshold for the racial minority”). 
136 See supra Tbl.2 and accompanying text. The one exception is that the median unemployed respondent 
rated six months of jail, rather than one, as equivalent to suffering an aggravated assault. The sample size for 
this group was quite small, however, and it is difficult to tell if this variance is meaningful or is just noise. 
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the welfare of arrestees relative to crime victims—might be misguided. This Part 
addresses those questions.   
A. In Theory, Detention is Rarely Justified
1. Statistical Risk is Insufficient
As bail reform gathered momentum, stakeholders placed a great deal of 
hope in actuarial risk assessment tools as mechanisms to make pretrial release and 
detention decisions. More than a thousand jurisdictions have now adopted such 
tools.137 To build them, developers analyze large data sets to identify correlations 
between case and defendant characteristics and future offending (or some proxy for 
future offending, like arrest).138 Each defendant receives a risk score based on their 
statistical likelihood of future arrest. The instrument divides these scores into 
categories, often “low risk,” “moderate risk,” and “high risk.”139 Actuarial risk 
assessment tools are widely believed to be more accurate in predicting future 
offending than human intuition, even the intuition of an experienced judge.140  
Can today’s pretrial risk assessment tools identify defendants who are so 
dangerous as to require detention pursuant to our survey results? The evidence is 
not promising. 
The first problem is that most current tools assess the likelihood of arrest 
for anything at all, including minor offenses.141 Given that our median survey 
respondent deems a few days in jail to be as bad as being robbed, it seems safe to 
posit that a risk of minor crime probably never justifies detention. The likelihood 
of “any future arrest” is simply not relevant to detention decisions.  
Some pretrial risk assessment tools do assess the likelihood of arrest for a 
violent offense, but even among those classified as high-risk, rates of rearrest for 
violence are quite low. In one widely used risk assessment tool, the PSA, 
137 Mariam Dembele, Mapping Pretrial Injustice, https://mediamobilizing.org/mapping-pretrial-injustice. 
138 For additional background on pretrial risk assessment, see, e.g., Mayson, supra note 10, at 507-16; 
Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 304 (2018); Jessica Eaglin, 
Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017); Sarah Desmarais & Evan Lowder, Safety & Justice 
Challenge, Pretrial Risk Assessment Project, http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/ resource/pretrial-risk-
assessment-tools-a-primer-for-judges-prosecutors-and-defense-attorneys. 
139 A crucial step in implementing a risk assessment tool is determining what risk threshold should divide 
the different categories. Let’s say a jurisdiction recommends pretrial detention only for defendants in the 
highest risk category. The risk assessment designer (and the task force overseeing the process) must determine 
what statistical risk should separate the moderate- from the high-risk category. This decision process is almost 
never conducted in a transparent manner. Nonetheless, some process occurs, and at the end of the day, a 
decision is made. See Eaglin, supra, at 85-88 (explaining the process by which risk assessment tool developers 
choose the “cut-off points” that create risk classifications). 
140 Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust, & Paul E. Meehl, Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE
1668 (1989), http://meehl.umn.edu/sites/meehl.dl.umn.edu/files/138cstixdawesfaustmeehl.pdf 
141 Mayson, supra note [X], at [x]. 
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defendants classified in the highest-risk category for “new violent criminal activity” 
had a less than a 4% rearrest rate for violence during the pretrial period (six to nine 
months).142 For the COMPAS risk assessment tool, only 2.5% of defendants in the 
highest risk group were rearrested for a violent offense within a month; 8% were 
rearrested for a violent offense within six months.143 Other studies of pretrial risk 
assessments report similarly low rates of violent recidivism.144  
With such low rearrest rates for violent crime even within the highest risk 
group, it appears unlikely that any existing pretrial tool is capable of identifying the 
degree of risk that could justify detention. Our survey found that one month of 
detention is as bad as an aggravated assault; to be justified, one month of detention 
must avert at least one aggravated assault. Detaining all those classified as high-
risk for violence by the COMPAS, for instance, is projected to avert only 25 violent 
offenses for every thousand people detained for one month. This is the equivalent 
of trading forty months of liberty to prevent one violent offense. The average 
“violent offense,” moreover, is less serious than an aggravated assault.145 
It is true that rearrest rates in validation studies might understate the number 
of crimes that the highest risk groups would actually commit, because validation 
142 Matthew Demichele, Peter Baumgartner, Michael Wenger, Kelle Barrick & Megan Comfort, The 
Public Safety Assessment: A Re- Validation And Assessment Of Predictive Utility and Differential Prediction 
by Race and Gender in Kentucky, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2020), available at 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1745-9133.12481. The pretrial period was between six and 
nine months for most defendants. This study does not specify which crimes are included in their measure of 
violent rearrest. 
143 THOMAS BLOMBERG, WILLIAM BALES, KAREN MANN, RYAN MELDRUM & JOE NEDELEC, BROWARD 
SHERIFF’S OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY CONTROL, VALIDATION OF THE COMPAS RISK ASSESSMENT
CLASSIFICATION INSTRUMENT (2010) (defining “violent crimes” to include murder, manslaughter, sex offenses, 
robbery, assault, battery, or other crimes in which the description indicates a person was harmed or under the 
threat of bodily injury). 
144 Studies of the federal Pretrial Risk Assessment (PTRA) indicate that people classified in the highest-
risk group have a 2.9% chance of rearrest for a violent offense during the pretrial period (11 months, on 
average). THOMAS H. COHEN, CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, & WILLIAM E. HICKS, PROBATION AND PRETRIAL 
SERVICES OFFICE, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURT, REVALIDATING THE FEDERAL PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (PTRA): A RESEARCH SUMMARY (2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files /82_2_3_0.pdf. This study defines violent
crimes to include homicide and related offenses, kidnapping, rape and sexual assault, robbery, and assault (both 
felony and misdemeanor). 
145 The validation studies cited above define “violent offense” to include simple assault and battery. See 
Blomberg, supra note 143, at 22; Demichele, supra note 142, at [xx]. They do not specify rates of rearrest for 
different subsets of violent offenses. Considering that the arrest rate for simple assault and battery is much 
higher than for other violent crimes, it stands to reason that the average cost of the violent offenses represented 
in these studies is lower than the cost of aggravated assault, robbery, or burglary. In other words, if incarcerating 
1000 people for a month averts 25 violent crimes, the harm of those crimes is expected to be less than the harm 
of 25 serious assaults. See Federal Bureau of Investigation: Uniform Crime Reporting, Crime in the United 
States 2017 tbl. 1 (last accessed Mar. 7, 2020), ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-
pages/tables/table-1 (reporting that in 2017, the arrest rate for simple assault was three times as high as for 
aggravated assault, five times as high as for burglary, eleven times as high as robbery, forty-six times as high 
as for rape, and eighty-seven times as high as for murder). 
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studies suffer from selection bias. We only see the pretrial rearrest rate for people 
who are not detained. Detained defendants may pose a higher crime risk than those 
who are released; if courts are judging risk accurately, this should be the case! The 
rearrest rate among released defendants might therefore understate the statistical 
meaning of a high-risk classification. Furthermore, the rearrest rate may understate 
the true number of crimes, since not all offenses result in arrest. 
In Appendix B, we conduct some back-of-the-envelope calculations to 
estimate what the true rate of serious crime is for those classified in the highest risk 
category for violent crime. We make a series of extreme assumptions designed to 
favor detention, yet still find that a high-risk classification does not indicate a 
degree of risk even close to severe enough to justify pretrial detention.146 It is 
possible that our risk assessment capacities could improve in future. But no one 
should hold their breath. Recent studies have found that complex machine-learning 
algorithms offer little improvement over simple checklist-style instruments with as 
few as two input variables.147 These studies suggest that interaction between input 
factors is not especially important to prediction,148 and that the marginal value of 
additional data is relatively low once a handful of important factors are accounted 
for.149 The best available research suggests that future crime is simply hard to 
predict, and will remain so. 
2. When Detention Is Warranted
The fact that contemporary risk assessment tools cannot justify pretrial 
detention on their own does not mean that detention is never warranted. As an initial 
matter, our survey results (and the risk-threshold they generate) presume status quo 
conditions of detention. The respondents deemed even short stints in jail to be as 
bad as criminal victimization because jail is a terrible place to be. With adequate 
political will, U.S. jails could be substantially less awful. Minimizing the costs of 
146 If one were to combine all of our extremely conservative assumptions at once, pretrial detention might 
be justified for the highest-risk category. However, we expect that these conservative assumptions are much 
too conservative. See Appendix B. 
147 See, e.g., J. Jung, C. Concannon, R. Shro_, S. Goel, and D. G. Goldstein, Simple Rules For Complex 
Decisions, ArXiv e-prints (Feb. 2017); Elaine Angelino, Nicholas Larus-Stone, Daniel Alabi, Margo Seltzer, 
and Cynthia Rudin, Learning Certifiably Optimal Rule Lists for Categorical Data, arXiv e-prints (Apr. 2017), 
p.arXiv:1704.01701; Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism,
4 SCIENCE ADVANCES (2018).
148 For instance, consider the input factors of age and current charge. It might be the case that age predicts 
future arrest differently for people charged with drug offenses than for people charged with property offenses. 
Complex machine-learning algorithms can identify and learn from such interactions in the data. If such 
interactions are substantial, machine learning algorithms should substantially outperform the simpler tools. But 
they do not. 
149 Age and criminal history are usually the best predictors of future crime. See Megan T. Stevenson & 
Christopher Slobogin, Algorithmic Risk Assessments and the Double-Edged Sword of Youth, 98 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 681 (2019). 
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detention to detainees would lower the risk threshold that justifies detention.150 
Even under status quo conditions, though, there are likely some cases that meet the 
survey-derived risk threshold. 
Murder, Rape, and Domestic Violence 
We have thus far omitted the risk of murder, rape, or domestic violence in 
our analysis. Murder and rape are extremely severe harms, and we don’t expect our 
Rawlsian survey method to function well for these types of crimes. It is not 
meaningful to ask how long someone would stay in jail to avoid being murdered; 
most everyone would agree to a lifetime. One could ask respondents how much 
time they would spend in jail to eliminate a given probability—say 10%—of being 
murdered, but then we are heavily leaning on people’s ability to evaluate small 
risks. Rape poses similar challenges, with the added difficulty that the boundaries 
of the crime itself are deeply contested.151 Domestic violence, meanwhile, differs 
from most other crime in that any given incident often belongs to an ongoing pattern 
of abuse.152 The harms to the victim encompass the experience of living in an 
abusive relationship.153 Considering the costs of one incident in isolation, as we do 
with burglary, robbery, and assault, would tend to understate its harm.  
That being said, one could easily extend our framework to include such 
offenses if one were willing to make an assumption about how the harms of these 
crimes compare to the ones analyzed here. For instance, if one were to assume that 
rape imposes harms that are ten times as grave as serious assault, then it could be 
justified to detain someone for a month if they pose a 10% risk of committing rape 
within a month if not detained. At this point we are not prepared to make such 
assumptions. We allow that there are likely instances in which people pose a grave 
enough risk of murder, rape, or domestic violence to justify pretrial detention. 
Exactly how many, we do not know. But we expect that only a minority of pretrial 
detainees are being held based on risks as specific as these. Most, we expect, are 
being held based on a much more nebulous conception of crime-risk. 
150 In addition to improving conditions of confinement, we might consider compensating detainees for 
non-punitive confinement. See generally Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating 
Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947 (2005); Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast 
of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 814 (1996) (“It would thus 
seem both fair and efficient to compensate [a person preventively detained] for the loss of [his freedom]—fair 
because he is paying out of his own resources to prevent harm to others and efficient because if he is 
compensated the community will not be likely to squander his freedom without justification.”); Zina 
Makar, Unnecessary Incarceration, 98 OR. L. REV. 607, 608 (2020) (advocating compensation for pretrial 
detention).  
151 See, e.g., Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 881 (2016). 
152 Cora Peterson et al., Lifetime Economic Burden of Intimate Partner Violence Among U.S. Adults, 55 




Case-Specific Evidence of Risk 
Risk assessment tools are not perfect, but there is broad consensus that they 
can predict future offending better than human beings.154 If risk assessment tools 
cannot identify a group of defendants who meet the risk threshold, judges will 
generally not be able to either.  
Yet courts may sometimes be able to identify individuals who present a 
substantial enough risk to warrant preventive detention on the basis of the particular 
facts of a case. Imagine a person charged with attempting to assault a man he 
believes to have slept with his wife. The defendant has repeatedly vowed to hurt 
this man at the first opportunity. He has a record of violence. He has little to lose. 
He goes so far as to tell the court that there is nothing the court can do, short of 
killing him; whenever he gets out he will exact his revenge.155 He does not intend 
to kill his rival, just to seriously injure him. The court might justifiably conclude, 
in this scenario, that there is something like a 75% chance of this man committing 
a serious assault within a week of release. That degree of risk might justify 
detention for that week. If, at the end of the week, the degree of risk remained as 
high, it would justify detention for another week. Continued detention might be 
justified until adjudication.     
We expect instances of case-specific risk that are substantial enough to 
warrant preventive detention to be exceedingly rare. Take our hypothetical 
defendant. If the most precise risk we can articulate is a 75% chance of serious 
assault within 30 days, it does not warrant preventive detention for thirty days under 
the survey risk-threshold. If there is less than 100% certainty that the assault will 
actually happen within a month, the projected harms of detention for the potential 
assailant outweigh the projected benefits of averted crime for the potential victim.  
This application of the analysis defies common moral intuitions. One’s 
instinct is to say that the would-be assailant should be detained in order to avert the 
harm that he threatens. Where have we gone wrong?   
Let us change the story slightly. Imagine that a defendant, Abe, has 
promised to assault someone named Carlos unless James, an innocent third party, 
is placed in jail for thirty days. Is it justifiable to detain James to avert the assault 
on Carlos? Here the intuitive answer is different. We venture to suggest that most 
people would feel that detaining James is not justified. 
154 Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust, & Paul E. Meehl, Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE
1668 (1989), http://meehl.umn.edu/sites/meehl.dl.umn.edu/files/138cstixdawesfaustmeehl.pdf 
155 These hypothetical facts very loosely recall the situation in Hendricks, in which the (convicted) 
defendant told the court “that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing children in the future was 
‘to die.’” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997). 
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We surmise that the reason it feels justified to detain Abe, but not James, in 
order to prevent an assault on Carlos is because the risk that Abe poses makes us 
care less about his well-being.156 In the cost-benefit analysis, we discount the harm 
that he would suffer from incarceration. We do not care as much that he may feel 
frustrated, powerless, bored, and afraid. It does not bother us that he may be eating 
gray baloney and sleeping with cockroaches. We have judged Abe to be at fault, 
and his discomforts weigh little on our conscience. This scenario takes us to the 
question of whether it is permissible to discount arrestees’ well-being in a cost-
benefit calculus, as we are inclined to discount Abe’s. 
B. Discounting Arrestees’ Well-Being
Our surveys suggest that preventive detention should be exceedingly rare. 
Yet, on any given day, there are almost 500,000 people detained pretrial in the 
United States, constituting three quarters of the total jail population.157 And these 
“moment in time” numbers understate the number of individuals who experience 
pretrial detention, because more than ten million people cycle through the jails 
annually.158 Current statistics do not disclose what fraction of them are detained 
pretrial, or for how long, but the number is likely to be in the millions.  
The reasons for pretrial detention vary. Some people are detained to prevent 
flight or evidence-tampering. Others might be detained inadvertently, because they 
were unable to pay the bail amount set. Nonetheless, we expect that a substantial 
portion of those detained each year (including those held on unaffordable bail) are 
detained due to concerns about crime-risk. Public discourse around pretrial 
detention has focused largely on public safety, suggesting that, at least in the public 
mind, crime risk is an important justification for detention rates.159 Judges 
frequently cite danger to the community when setting high bail or denying bond.160 
What accounts for the disconnect between theory and practice? Our 
hypothesis is that pretrial detention rates are high—and will remain high in the 
absence of constraints—in large part because judges, lawmakers, and ordinary 
156 In philosophical terms, the intuition might be that Abe is culpable for threatening the harm; he has 
forfeited his right against preventive confinement, see Walen, A Punitive Precondition, supra note 73; or he is 
a “culpable aggressor” who we may justifiably restrain on Carlos’ behalf, see Ferzan, supra note 73; or he has 
incurred a duty to dispel the threat, see Duff, supra note [X]; Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral 
Foundations of the Criminal Law (2011); or perhaps he should even be subject to punishment for his culpable 
act, see Husak, supra note [X]. Alternately, the intuition may be that detaining James to protect Carlos violates 
the Kantian prohibition on using people purely as a means. E.g. Samuel Kerstein, Treating Persons as 
Means, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition, Edward N. Zalta ed.), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/persons-means.  
157 Zeng, supra note 21, at fg.1 & tbl.3. 
158 Id. at 1.  
159 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
160 Mayson, supra note 23, at [xx]. 
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citizens discount the well-being of potential detainees relative to the well-being of 
potential crime victims. This relative indifference can manifest itself in a judge’s 
bail decision, in press coverage that erupts in outrage every time a person on pretrial 
release commits a crime, and in the laws and incentive structures that policymakers 
construct for the pretrial process.  
The impulse to privilege crime victims over (possible) past and future crime 
perpetrators is understandable, but it is important to try to disentangle the grounds 
for discounting the costs of detention to detainees in order to assess whether they 
are sound. The discussion that follows evaluates four distinct arguments that our 
conceptual framework and survey method are misguided in valuing the welfare of 
arrestees by the same standard as the welfare of potential crime victims. Each 
argument claims that the harm of detention to detainees should be systematically 
discounted in some way for purposes of the cost-benefit analysis. 
1. Time-Served
A first argument is that our survey results overstate the cost of pretrial 
detention because, in reality, the time that people spend detained before trial will 
be credited toward any jail or prison sentence they receive.161  
There are three problems with this proposition. First, discounting 
someone’s well-being in the present on the grounds that they may be convicted in 
the future looks a lot like pretrial punishment. Second, only a small fraction of 
arrestees are ultimately convicted and sentenced to a jail or prison sentence.162 Even 
accepting the time-served proposition, it is not clear that it would meaningfully alter 
the survey-derived risk thresholds.163 And third, discounting the costs of detention 
on this “time-served” basis does not even make sense in a consequentialist 
framework.  
If crediting pretrial detention toward punishment reduces its costs, it also 
reduces its benefits. Imagine a hypothetical defendant, Amy, whose pretrial 
detention is credited against her sentence of one year’s incarceration. Given that 
Amy would have spent a year incarcerated regardless, whatever benefit her 
detention had—whatever crime it averted—is a benefit that her sentence would 
have produced in any case. One year’s imprisonment is one year’s imprisonment 
161 Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 549-51 (identifying and analyzing this basis for 
discounting the value of pretrial detainees’ liberty).  
162 Approximately three-quarters of arrests are for misdemeanors, very few of which end in a jail sentence. 
Among felony arrests, a substantial percentage do not result in conviction; among felony convictions, a 
substantial percentage result in probation. See Mayson, supra note 10, at [x]; Colin Starger, The Argument that 
Cried Wolfish, MIT Computational law, https://law.mit.edu/pub/theargumentcrieswolfish/release/2 (Aug. 14, 
2020) (finding that 60.81% of cases filed in Maryland District Court in Baltimore City between 2013-2017 
were dropped prior to adjudication). 
163 For a fuller explanation, see Mayson, supra note 10, at [x]. 
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whether it begins in July or October. If one treats Amy’s detention as cost-free for 
purposes of the analysis because it gets absorbed into her punishment, one must 
also treat it as benefit-free. Her detention simply drops out of the cost-benefit 
calculus altogether.164 This is conceptually coherent, after all; her detention has 
been converted into punishment, such that neither its costs nor its benefits belong 
in a cost-benefit analysis of regulatory pretrial detention.165 
Finally, it seems worth noting the perversity of the time-served argument 
given that many “time-served” sentences are, in fact, a direct result of pretrial 
detention.166 When a person is detained on minor charges prosecutors will typically 
offer a sentence of “time served” if the person pleads guilty. The incentive is 
overwhelming, even if the person might have fought the charges if she had been at 
liberty. People plead guilty to go home. A not-insignificant number of people 
whose detention is ultimately credited toward their sentence of incarceration would 
not have received a sentence of incarceration at all had they not been detained—or 
would have received a shorter one. To treat detention-credited-toward-punishment 
as costless is to allow detention to justify itself. Detention produces a carceral 
sentence that justifies detention! It is dazzling alchemy, but it is perverse. 
2. “Correct” Detentions as Cost-Free
A second argument is that only erroneous detentions should count as costs 
in the consequentialist caculus—that is, detention of those who would not actually 
have committed the harm in question. Most of the scholars who have considered 
preventive detention in cost-benefit terms have assumed this proposition. If they 
are right, then it is appropriate to discount the cost of detention by excluding 
164 Accord Yang, supra note 74, at 1432–33 (“[I]f a defendant would be incarcerated post-trial regardless 
of pre-trial detention, and the defendant is given credit for time spent in jail pre-trial, the gains from 
reducing pre-trial crime are merely shifted forward in time and should generally not be included in a cost-
benefit analysis.”). 
165 It is actually possible that the effects of a year’s incarceration might vary to some extent on the basis 
of the timing of the incarceration (i.e. pretrial or postconviction), as Gregg Polsky helpfully noted. It is not 
clear to us, however, that serving some of the year pretrial would necessarily entail more benefit and less cost 
than serving it all post-conviction, rather than more cost and less benefit.  
166 As a growing body of empirical scholarship has demonstrated, pretrial detention causally increases the 
likelihood of conviction, the likelihood of a carceral sentence, and the expected length of the sentence. Will 
Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and 
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201 (2018); Arpit Gupta, 
Christopher Hansman, and Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge 
Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUDIES 471 (2016); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The 
Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 741–59, 787 (2017); 
Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence 
from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & Econ. 529 (2017); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: 
How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 511 (2018); Christopher T. 
Lowenkamp et al., Laura & John T. Arnold Found., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention (2013). 
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“correct” detentions, the detention of those who would in fact have committed 
crime if not detained.  
The notion that errors are the relevant costs is familiar from the context of 
criminal adjudication. The costs of concern there are wrongful convictions and 
wrongful acquittals, Type I and Type II errors, and insofar as we invoke cost-benefit 
analysis to inform our adjudication structures we strive to weigh the relative costs 
of these errors. Jurists and scholars have typically deemed a wrongful conviction to 
be much more costly than a wrongful acquittal. Thus Blackstone famously wrote 
that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”167 It 
is ten times worse, in other words, to wrongfully convict than to wrongfully acquit. 
In statistical terms, a false positive is ten times as costly as a false negative. This 
“cost ratio” translates loosely into the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.168 We require such proof in order to minimize wrongful convictions, even at 
the cost of letting additional guilty people go free.169  
A direct translation of the Blackstone ratio to the preventive detention 
context would also consider errors.  Alan Dershowitz undertook such a translation 
when he noted, in 1974, that “there is no comparable aphorism” for preventive 
confinement and asked what it might be: “[I]s it better for X number of ‘false 
positives’ to be erroneously confined (and for how long?) than for Y number of 
preventable harms (and of what kind?) to occur? What relationship between X and 
Y does justice require?”170 Other scholars have also assumed that errors are the 
relevant costs to balance to determine when preventive detention is justified.171 
167 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1760). 
168 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Because the standard of proof affects 
the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied 
in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social 
disutility of each.”); id. at 372 (“I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case 
as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man 
than to let a guilty man go free.”); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (“The heavy standard applied 
in criminal cases manifests our concern that the risk of error to the individual must be minimized even at the 
risk that some who are guilty might go free.”). 
169 To adhere to the Blackstone ratio exactly, we should calibrate our standard for conviction such that it 
allows up to ten false negatives for each false positive. Precisely what degree of statistical confidence in guilt 
this would require depends on the base rate of guilty versus innocent people in the trial pool. The base rate will 
also effect “the actual ratio of errors” that a 10:1 cost ratio produces. E.g. Nicholas Scurich & Richard John, The 
Normative Threshold for Psychiatric Civil Commitment, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 425, 438 (2010). It is important to 
note, moreover, that this is not a universal interpretation of Blackstone’s principle. Some scholars, including 
Professor Laurence Tribe, believe the point of the principle is to preclude rather than to minimize false 
positives. Tribe, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 2. 
170 Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 60 (concluding that “[w]e have not even begun to ask these kinds of 
questions, or to develop modes of analysis for answering them”). 
171 E.g. Dershowitz, supra note 9; John Monahan, Strategies for an Empirical Analysis of the Prediction 
of Violence in Emergency Civil Commitment, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 370 (1977) (“[I]t may be better that ten 
‘false positives’ suffer commitment for three days than that one ‘false negative’ go free to kill someone during 
that period.”); Nicholas Scurich and Richard John, The Normative Threshold for Psychiatric Civil Commitment, 
50 JURIMETRICS J. 425-452 (2010) (interpreting Addington v. Texas to hold “that in the context of civil 
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But a focus on errors is inappropriate in the preventive context. A costs-of-
error framework makes sense for adjudications of guilt, where it is permissible to 
discount the harm inflicted on a person who is accurately convicted and punished 
because, at least in theory, that harm is deserved. In the preventive detention 
context, by contrast, the harm inflicted on the person detained is never justified by 
a finding of guilt. The determination that justifies detention is an ex ante assessment 
of the likelihood of future harm. And a person cannot be held responsible for 
possible future harm. Thus all preventive detention is costly, in the sense that the 
state makes no claim that it is deserved. Every single instance of detention 
subordinates the welfare of the detained person to the public good. There is simply 
no conceptual basis to discount the welfare of those who, in a hypothetical 
counterfactual universe, would have committed harm.172 
3. Culpability for Risk
A related notion is that, even if the state cannot discount the value of 
arrestees’ welfare on the basis of their counterfactual future guilt, it can discount 
the liberty of those who pose a risk. The idea is that people are generally responsible 
for whatever traits make them risky, and are culpable for having those traits or for 
failing to correct them.173 The problem with this logic is that the traits that make 
someone high-risk may be entirely beyond a person’s control. As a statistical 
matter, for instance, age and gender are among the most powerful predictors of 
future criminal activity.174 Teenage men are the highest-risk demographic across 
time and national boundaries.175 Even assuming that some people are responsible 
for some of the facts that render them risky, like gang involvement, invoking that 
responsibility as grounds for discounting their welfare raises a difficult due process 
commitment the cost of a false positive is greater than a false negative;” inferring the requirement for civil 
commitment that false positives cannot outnumber false negatives; analyzing a dataset, and concluding that 
only the highest-risk group that the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment tool can identify, for whom the 
projected rate of violent crime is 52.7%, should be committed); Vars, supra note 104 (treating “correct” 
detentions as having no cost relevant to a cost-benefit analysis of detention).  
172 The concept of an “false positive” is arguably not even coherent in the context of a probabilistic 
assessment of risk. Whereas an adjudication of guilt is a factual determination, made ex-post, preventive 
detention decisions require a probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of future harm, made ex ante. We can 
never know when we have “erroneously” detained someone, because we can never know what that person 
would have done had she not been detained. Even if we could know that she would have committed no harm, 
it is not clear that the detention was “in error” if the risk was great enough. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, 
Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2244 (2019) (“If an event assessed as likely does not transpire, it does not render 
the initial probabilistic assessment ‘false.’”). Finally, at a metaphysical level, unless one believes that the future 
is wholly determined (excluding even quantum indeterminacy), the problem with holding someone accountable 
for crime they would have committed in a counterfactual universe is not just epistemic but ontological: there 
is no truth of the matter about what would have happened under counterfactual conditions.  
173 See Husak, supra note [X].  
174 See, e.g., Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 149. 
175 T. Hirschi & M. Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552 (1983). 
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question: Is it permissible for the state to invoke a person’s culpability for past acts 
as grounds for discounting their welfare, without a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt and rigorous adversarial process? That question brings us to the 
most obvious ground for discounting the welfare of arrestees relative to crime 
victims, and the ground that is most difficult to resolve.  
4. Culpability for Past Conduct
Barring unlawful arrests, there is probable cause to believe that every 
arrestee is guilty of a crime. As between a person for whom there is probable cause 
to believe her guilty of a crime and a person for whom there is no such cause, it is 
a human tendency to privilege the well-being of the latter. The arrested person 
(probably) did something wrong! Her liberty does not deserve the same protection 
as the liberty of a wholly innocent person.  
The problem with this rationale is that it involves differential treatment on 
the basis of guilt, or possible guilt, prior to a criminal conviction. One of us has 
evaluated this rationale for discounting arrestees’ welfare in a prior article, 
Dangerous Defendants.176 As that article notes, private citizens may be justified in 
treating accused persons with less concern than potential crime victims, but the 
government is in a different position. Due process prohibits the government from 
subjecting a person “to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and 
to the possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict 
him.”177 This is because such judgments inflict profound and unique expressive 
harm. “Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every 
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is 
reasonable doubt about his guilt.”178  
It is the difficulty of assessing guilt fairly that creates a “pretrial” phase in 
the first place. The entirety of the procedural regime that governs criminal 
proceedings is designed to prevent the state from lending its power to casual, 
arbitrary, vindictive, or incorrect judgments of guilt.179 Given the importance of 
176 See Mayson, supra note 10, at [x] (developing this point in more depth). 
177 In re Winship, 397 U.S.358, 367 (1970); see also id. at 361-65 (holding that only proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict). Cf. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Preventive Justice and the Presumption 
of Innocence, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 505, 515, 523 (2014) (arguing that a state may preventively restrain “culpable 
aggressors” but should be required to prove culpability beyond a reasonable doubt).  
178 Id. at 363-64. The Constitution demands this protection even for civil proceedings that trigger 
(purportedly) non-punitive consequences only. Id. at 367; see also, e.g., Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (stating that probable cause “means less than evidence which would justify 
condemnation”); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (noting that the function of the probable 
cause determination is not to establish blameworthiness but rather “to safeguard citizens from rash and 
unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime”). 
179 Winship, 397 U.S. at 367; see also infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
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these protections, the possible guilt of pretrial detainees is, at best, a dubious ground 
for discounting the value of their liberty before trial.  
The argument against taking culpability into account is not watertight, 
however. At least one Supreme Court opinion has deemed a person’s apparent 
culpability for creating a risk to be relevant to how his interests should be weighed. 
In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court considered whether Scott, a police officer, 
violated the Fourth Amendment by using a “pit maneuver” to run Harris’ car off 
the road after Harris fled a traffic stop.180 The resulting crash left Harris a 
quadriplegic. Writing for an eight-justice majority, Justice Scalia explained that the 
reasonableness of a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes is a matter of interest-
balancing.181 In Scott’s case, Scalia reasoned, it was appropriate “to take into 
account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability.”182 
Since Harris had “intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by 
unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight,” his welfare was entitled to 
less weight than that of innocent people he had put at risk.183 The Court held that 
Officer Scott was entitled to summary judgment because his conduct was 
reasonable as a matter of law. 
There are reasons not to accord too much weight to the culpability language 
in Scott. It is arguably dicta. The Court’s assessment of the parties’ relative 
culpability is questionable; there is a plausible argument that Scott and the other 
officers who chased Harris were the ones who created the unnecessary risk.184 
Finally, Scott might have it wrong. It is far from clear that police officers should be 
weighing moral responsibility to make split-second decisions about whether to use 
deadly force, or that the constitutionality of that force should be contingent on the 
moral status of the person they hurt or kill. 
Yet Scalia’s abstract point is hard to dismiss. It seems unjust to ask a 
potential victim to bear as much of a burden as a person we have good reason to 
believe has culpably created a risk.185 Even progressive bail reform strategies seem 
tied to ideas of desert. Many bail reform advocates, for instance, would limit 
eligibility for pretrial detention to those charged with serious offenses on strong 
evidence.186 Most people see pretrial detention as particularly unjust when charges 
are eventually dropped.187 If the ground for detention is risk, this focus on the 
180 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
181 Id. at 383 (quoting and citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
182 Id. at 384.   
183 Id. 
184 The record is somewhat unclear, but presumably the officers had Harris’ license plate number and 
could have tracked him down after the fact rather than chasing him immediately. 
185 See, e.g., Ferzan, supra notes 73 and 177. 
186 See sources cited in supra note [X] (model pretrial release and detention schemes).  
187 Starger, supra note 162 (using an “original dataset of over 150,000 Maryland District Court cases” to 
show that “every year thousands of accused persons are routinely jailed for extended periods on charges that 
are ultimately dropped”). 
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charge is misplaced. Except in edge cases, like the hypothetical arrestee who 
credibly threatens imminent harm, current charges tend to provide little information 
about the likelihood of future criminal conduct. Many pretrial risk assessment tools 
do not even include the current charges as a risk factor. Reform strategies focused 
heavily on the charged offense may be motivated in part by the sense that people 
charged with minor crimes or charged on weak evidence do not deserve to be 
incarcerated before trial.188  
The sense that culpability should inform pretrial detention practice is 
eminently understandable. No one likes the idea of detention on grounds of risk 
alone.189 And it is hard to shake the feeling that “bad” people should be stopped 
from hurting “good” people. Did you worry about Harvey Weinstein being stuck in 
jail? On an emotional level, we cannot help but feel that some people deserve to be 
subject to heightened restraint, presumption of innocence be damned.  
At the start of the Article, we assumed that this kind of reasoning would run 
afoul of the constitutional prohibition on pretrial punishment, but the reality is more 
complex. On one plausible definition of punishment, the feature that distinguishes 
it from other forms of hard treatment is that it is inflicted in order to convey moral 
censure, and thus inflicted because of, rather than in spite of, the suffering it 
entails.190 If one adopts this view, discounting the value of an arrestee’s welfare on 
the basis of apparent culpability does not, alone, amount to punishment. The 
government can accord her welfare less value in a cost-benefit analysis with no 
specific intent to convey moral censure. It will regret having to detain her, locking 
her up despite rather than because of what she will suffer. We could conceivably 
design a pretrial detention regime where a preliminary judgment of culpability is 
necessary to authorize detention, and detention is limited by the degree of apparent 
guilt. Whether such detention would constitute “punishment” in an open question, 
both in terms of theory and in terms of constitutional doctrine.  
This Article cannot resolve the question of whether the government should 
be permitted to discount the value of arrestees’ welfare, relative to potential crime 
victims, on the basis of their apparent culpability for charged conduct. But we urge 
caution. American law has built an elaborate procedural edifice to protect against 
unwarranted governmental judgments of guilt. We have a system for punishing 
188 The alternate motivation for limiting pretrial detention by certain charge-based constraints is simply to 
ensure some categorical limits on detention, as American bail law has historically done. [Add cites.] 
189 But see Sandra G. Mayson, In Defense of Consequentialist Prevention (work in progress) (arguing that 
a frank consequentialist approach to preventive state coercion might be more liberty-protective than the 
deontological approach that current dominates theory and jurisprudence). 
190 E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in The Routledge Companion to the 
Philosophy of Law 143 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (defining punishment as infliction of hard treatment 
“because of, and not despite” the suffering it will cause); Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak: Preventive 
Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173, 1189 (2011) (“[A] sanction is not a punishment without 
a purpose to deprive and censure.”); Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note [X], at 539-40 & n.234.  
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Harvey Weinstein: criminal sentencing. It happens after conviction for good reason. 
Retributivism and consequentialism will always co-exist awkwardly in the criminal 
justice system, but the current scale of pretrial incarceration suggests that the 
retributive impulse has been running without check in an environment in which it 
should be, at most, an occasional and suspect guest.    
C. Implications for Bail Reform
In theory, bail determinations are relatively straightforward. Magistrates are 
supposed to evaluate any relevant risk that defendants pose and determine how to 
mitigate it in the least restrictive way possible. The challenges of this task are 
largely technical. It demands skills in prediction as well as knowledge about what 
type of interventions best mitigate risk for defendants with different needs. It is not 
supposed to entail the evaluation of culpability or worth. The perception of the bail 
hearing as largely administrative helps to explain its lack of procedural protections. 
Bail hearings tend to be brief, often only one or two minutes. Many jurisdictions 
do not recognize a right to counsel for the accused. Bail magistrates may not even 
be lawyers, let alone judges. In the judicial hierarchy, bail magistrates live near the 
bottom.  
This Article suggests, however, that bail magistrates are not engaged in a 
straightforward cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps their decisions are influenced by 
their perception of arrestees’ culpability or worth. Or perhaps they are simply 
responding to structural incentives and detaining individuals who pose any risk to 
avoid being excoriated in a front-page news story for having released someone who 
then commits a terrible crime.191 Whatever the mechanisms at work, bail 
magistrates seem to be engaged in a mental and moral calculus that is something 
other than a technical evaluation of risk.192  
The disconnect between theory and practice may shed light on why certain 
reform strategies have faltered. If the bail decision is purely consequentialist, then 
adopting tools that aid bail magistrates in predicting reoffending, like actuarial risk 
assessment tools, should be a no-brainer. But magistrates’ response to risk 
assessment algorithms has been lukewarm.193 They ignore the recommendations 
associated with the risk assessment more often than not, and use fades over time.194 
191 See, e.g., Aurelie Ouss and Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: the Influence of 
Prosecutors, work in progress (manuscript on file with authors); W. David Ball, The Peter Parker Problem, 95 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 879 (2020). 
192 See also Sandra G. Mayson, After Money Bail: Lifting the Veil on Pretrial Detention, Law & Political 
Economy Project Blog (Feb. 15, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/blog/after-money-bail-lifting-the-veil-on-
pretrial-detention (arguing that “we have been using money bail, and the detention it produces, to meet a host 
of social needs”). 
193 Stevenson, supra note 138 at 373 (reporting that judges deviated from the recommendations associated 
with the risk assessment more often than not). 
194 Id. at 309. 
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The usual explanation is that judges are irrationally distrustful of the technology, 
or overly confident in their ability to predict. If the bail determination is not 
primarily an evaluation of risk, on the other hand, the problem may be that the 
technology doesn’t match the task as magistrates perceive it.  
Recognizing that judgments of desert—conscious or unconscious—may 
play a role in bail determinations also helps to illuminate certain hazards for reform. 
Bail scholarship, for instance, has tended to assume that magistrates are engaged in 
a consequentialist cost-benefit analysis.195 This assumption influences how 
empirical results are interpreted, as well as what policy changes seem sensible. For 
instance, one prominent paper has attributed racial disparity in bail decisions to 
prediction errors: a belief that black defendants pose a higher crime risk than they 
actually do.196 The authors infer that we can reduce disparity by improving 
prediction, either through the use of risk assessment tools or through experience 
and training.197 If the bail decision is not primarily a consequentialist one, both the 
diagnosis of the problem and the proposed solution are less likely to be correct.  
Bail reformers, meanwhile, face a difficult question about whether to insist 
on consequentialist principles or to embrace some retributive criterion for pretrial 
detention. On the one hand, a pure cost-benefit approach is the cleanest. 
Discounting the well-being of arrestees prior to conviction is anathema to liberal 
values. As our analysis suggests, moreover, that strict adherence to consequentialist 
principles should produce extremely low rates of pretrial detention. On the other 
hand, pure consequentialism can be a bitter pill to swallow. Many advocates recoil 
at the idea of considering demographic factors (like age, gender, neighborhood 
characteristics, etc.) in a risk assessment, even if such factors are relevant to the 
risk of future crime. Rejecting the inclusion of nonculpable factors in the evaluation 
of risk is an implicit endorsement of the principle that culpability is relevant to 
restrictions on pretrial liberty.  
Finally, reformers must reckon with the fact that the human impulse is to 
evaluate culpability and worth when determining whom to detain and whom to 
release. Whether or not the law permits bail magistrates to discount the well-being 
of arrestees in the risk calculus, human beings are inclined to do so. This is 
happening, regardless of our formal disapproval. Bail magistrates are engaging in 
a complex, messy, and fraught determination that melds risk and worth, with liberty 
in the balance. If we decide that culpability is relevant to bail determinations, those 
determinations will require clear guidance and much greater care.198 Assembly-line 
hearings are not appropriate to official determinations of desert. Conversely, to the 
195 See, e.g. Jon Kleinberg et. al, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 QUARTERLY JOURNAL 
OF ECONOMICS 237, and Arnold, Dobbie and Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 QUARTERLY JOURNAL
OF ECONOMICS 1885. 
196 Arnold, Dobbie and Yang, id. at 1889. 
197 Id. at 1929. 
198 Mayson, supra note [x] and [x-x] (elaborating on this point). 
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extent that determinations of pretrial liberty should adhere to strictly 
consequentialist criteria, the realities of human psychology mean that we will need 
to alter the incentive structure for magistrates, and implement structural constraints 
on detention that can withstand pressure over time.  
CONCLUSION 
Purely preventive detention is a fixture of governance. Yet despite hundreds 
of years of practice, the law provides little guidance about what type and degree of 
risk justifies a complete deprivation of liberty. This lack has become more salient 
with the spread of pretrial risk assessment, because a jurisdiction that adopts 
statistical tools must explicitly decide what risk-threshold divides those who may 
warrant preventive detention from those who do not.  
This Article has offered an analytical framework for deriving a risk-
threshold for pretrial preventive detention and an empirical method to implement 
it. Our results demonstrate a profound disconnect between theory and practice. If 
bail courts were faithfully employing the consequentialist principles entailed by 
constitutional doctrine, pretrial detention on the basis of dangerousness would be 
exceedingly rare. Instead, it is exceedingly common. Consequentialism may be the 
stated rationale for depriving people of pretrial liberty, but it is not the governing 
force behind daily practice.  
Consequentialist interest balancing is the rationale for preventive detention 
in other arenas as well. Whenever a person is detained in whole or in part to prevent 
future harm, there must be some tradeoff between the harm averted and the harm 
imposed.199 The framework and tools developed in this Article apply directly to 
settings where the state detains individuals with no claim that detention is deserved, 
including material witness detention, involuntary commitment, quarantine, and 
wartime detention of citizens. The particular judgments from our jail-versus-crime 
survey translate best to other forms of detention to prevent intentional future harm: 
sex offender commitment, material witness detention, and, loosely, traditional civil 
commitment.  
Perhaps in other preventive detention settings there will be a closer accord 
between theory and practice. But without interrogating the nature and degree of risk 
that justifies a particular deprivation of liberty, we cannot know. The state’s 
199 Things get complicated when the state claims that the detention is deserved or that the detainee had a 
limited right to liberty in the first place. The conceptual framework developed here therefore does not apply 
cleanly to punitive incapacitation, juvenile detention or immigration detention. To develop a coherent 
justification framework in such circumstances one must establish what exactly the detainee deserves and how 
desert relates to utilitarian benefit as a justification for detention, or, in the case of limited a priori liberty rights, 
how to weigh the detainee’s liberty interest in a cost-benefit calculus. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Retributive 
Desert and Deterrence: How Both Cohere in a Single Theory of Punishment, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS (Jonathan Jacobs, ed. 2016). 
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authority to deprive a person of freedom on the basis of potential future harm is one 
of its most fearsome powers. Unless we are willing to confront the difficult 
tradeoffs that preventive detention requires, we risk the possibility that vague 
consequentialist reasoning will serve to cloak other, and uglier, forces.  
APPENDIX A 
The two tables below show a sample of responses from the serious assault 
survey. The first table shows the first ten responses that were dropped from the 
analysis because a research assistant flagged them as failing our attention checks. 
In some, the respondent has included unresponsive text that was likely copied from 
the internet. (Alternatively, the respondent might be a bot using text analysis to 
complete the survey.) In some, the person answered one or two questions in good 
faith, but subsequent responses were nonsensical, blank, or only tangentially related 
to the question. The second table shows the first ten responses that were included 
in the analysis for serious assault. For each table, the first two columns show 
answers to the initial priming questions, the third/fourth columns show responses 
to the core open-answer question, and the final column shows the respondent’s 
explanation for their answer. 
Examples of dropped responses 






In examining this topic, 
we reviewed research 
and scholarship from 
criminology, law, 
penology ... Prisons in 
the United States are 
for the most part 
remote, closed ... 
Although individual 
prisons can vary widely 
in their nature and 
effects, a ... the prison 
yard, reducing the time 
prisoners could spend 
watching television, 
placing ... 
In order to call a death 
a homicide, we must 
find the following facts 
to be true: ... Suppose 
that a police officer 
lawfully orders a 
fleeing felon to halt, but 
that the felon ... or 
resistance by the 
victim, such as robbery, 
rape, or aggravated 
assault), that ... is 
sufficient under Indiana 
law to constitute an 
attempt to commit an 
offense. 






JAIL IS THE 
DIFICULT PLACE 
ALWAYS HAVE A 
KNIFE  
WHAT EVER 
INFORM TO THE 
NEAR BY POLICE 
STATION  
ALWAYS HAVE SOS 
MESSAGING 
SYSTEM 
20 Day(s) FOR DOING SOME 
THEFT IN THE 
SHOP 
I LOVE VERY MUCH GOOD VERY LIKE 3 Month(s) GOOD VERY LIKE 
boring time, cleanness, 
beaten, mental torture.  
finger print, forgotten 
things, weapons, dress, 
3 Month(s) some of the land 
problem in near my 
relatives. 
The hardest thing about 
being in prison is not 
the time the judge 
gives you, but ... a man 
who was incarcerated 
at 22 and has spent the 
last 30 years in prison. 
... â€œI had no idea 
how much pain I would 
be forced to carry 
alone.â€• 
characteristics, a 
victim's ability to cope 
with the impact of 
crime depends on a 
variety ... Generally, 
violent crime victims 
have a more difficult 
time coping than 
property ... Become 
familiar with the 
culture and traditions of 
the populations being 
served. ... or child 
sexual assault, as well 
as observing the serious 
injury or death  
96 Week(s) ok good 
All right from pre task, 
we're gonna be in this 
mechanical room 
walking through it not 
working in it. So right 
away there is a, there is 
a safety hazard right 
away or safety concern. 
We've got a big, big 
step right here that we 
got to go over and then 
the piping. Once we get 
to the pipe over the 
piping was over that 
ladder. And we're 
gonna be working on 
this chiller right here. 
Other than that, I mean 
there's really nothing 
else. Be careful with. 
All right from pre task, 
we're gonna be in this 
mechanical room 
walking through it not 
working in it. So right 
away there is a, there is 
a safety hazard right 
away or safety concern. 
We've got a big, big 
step right here that we 
got to go over and then 
the piping. Once we get 
to the pipe over the 
piping was over that 
ladder. And we're 
gonna be working on 
this chiller right here. 
Other than that, I mean 
there's really nothing 
else. Be careful with. 
10 Month(s) All right from pre 
task, we're gonna be 
in this mechanical 
room walking 
through it not 
working in it. So 
right away there is a, 
there is a safety 
hazard right away or 
safety concern. 
We've got a big, big 
step right here that 
we got to go over and 
then the piping. Once 
we get to the pipe 
over the piping was 
over that ladder. And 
we're gonna be 
working on this 
chiller right here. 
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There's water. It's wet 
out here. 
There's water. It's wet 
out here. 
Other than that, I 
mean there's really 
nothing else. Be 
careful with. There's 
water. It's wet out 
here. 
1000 Month(s) 
Good good 10000 Year(s) Good 
feel very bad in jail 
because that place is 
not in freedom 
robbery 1 Month(s) the assault is very 
dangerous to try it 
i don't told anything for 
my nation 
i think first save my 
nation next save other 
member after me 
saving 
5 Year(s) long time i need for 
my nation 
Examples of included responses 







Not being able to smoke. 
Losing my job. Being 
lonely. Being scared. 
Losing all freedom.  
Traumatic stress. 
Nightmares. Never trusting 
anyone again. Being jumpy 
all the time.  
1 Day(s) I could do one day 
easily.  
Being away from my kids, 
money for extra food or 
phone calls, no privacy, 
dealing with other inmates 
all the time.  
Healing, explaining to 
people what happened, 
having to relive the attack, 
possible nightmares, 
medical expenses 
2 Week(s) Assult i would 
heal within that 
time i think  
The gross food 
Missing my cats 
No alone time 
Being trapped in a cell 
Trouble sleeping 
Trouble trusting people 
Living in fear 
Physical scars/damage 
6 Month(s) I think being in 
jail for 6 mos 
would start to 
impact you 
mentally and 
would stay with 
you for a while. 
The same goes for 
an assault. It 
would be hard to 




not being able to make 
choices 
being around so many 
different people 
not seeing family 
not feeling safe 
having to retell the story 




6 Month(s) I value time with 
my family to the 
point that I would 
rather survive an 
assault than to 
have time away 
from them. 
1. Fear of inability to
assimilate to jail life
2. Lack of respect of
inmates towards one
another
3. Spiral into a life of
further crime and/or more
jail time
4. Removed from society,
family, and friends
1. Fear of a second attack
from any stranger you
encounter
2. Lack of trust in society
and people in general
overall
3. Inability to do certain
activities like be alone or
out at night
4. Memory of the attack
living in your mind forever
5 Day(s) I feel like jailtime 
screws up your 
professional life 
and career, while 
the equivalent 
assault screws up 










loss of security 
fear 
1 Month(s) the isolation and 
loneliness of 
being in jail 
would become 
unbearable after 1 
month 
Communal living 
conditions. Time alone. 
Regimented activities. 
Surveillance. Intimidation 
of peers and guards. Time 
apart from loved ones. 
Lost time. 
Physical problems. Loss of 
productive time. Fear of it 
happening again. 
5 Month(s) Three months can 
go by pretty 
quick, 4 is 
borderline but 5 is 
kind of long, it 
depends on how 
much injury is 
involved. 
Lack of sleep 
Sharing space with 
strangers 
Bad Food 
Not seeing family and 
friends 
Thinking it's going to 
happen again 
Pain 
Ongoing medical issues 
Fear of going out 






recover mostly.  
So I think that is 
fairly equivalent. 
The embarrassment would 
be a huge factor. That and 
the record that comes with 
being in jail. Court costs 
would hurt. Losing my job 
would be a big deal as 
well 
The physical fear 
afterwards of it being able 
to happen at any time again. 
The fear that people are out 
there... waiting to hurt you. 
Hurt anyone. Willing to kill 
you for whatever you got. 
Willing to hurt you because 




you disagree with them or 
have something they don't 
have. 
Not seeing family, having 
a poor diet, going 
mentally insane, and being 
scared of others. 
It would be extremely 
traumatizing. I would have 
to deal with that and also 
paranoia. I would live with 
the mental scars of it all. 
Additionally, the physical 
pain endured would be 
tough. 
1 Year(s) This was tough so 
I went with an 
arbitrary period of 
time. 
APPENDIX B 
Rearrest rates in validation studies might understate the number of crimes 
that the highest risk groups would actually commit, because validation studies 
suffer from selection bias. We only see the pretrial rearrest rate for people who are 
not detained, and detained defendants may pose a higher crime risk than those who 
are released.  
It is impossible to know how serious the selection bias is, but we can assume 
the worst and see how it affects the analysis. Let us assume that 50% of high-risk 
defendants are detained (a realistic assumption),200 and that every single one of 
them would otherwise be arrested for a violent crime within a month (an 
extraordinarily unrealistic assumption). Finally, assume that the violent-arrest rate 
for released high-risk defendants is 2.5% within a month, as in the COMPAS study, 
which reported the highest recidivism rates among available studies. On these 
assumptions, a high-risk classification corresponds to a 51.25% chance of violent 
rearrest within a month, absent detention.201 Even this probability of violence does 
not meet the survey-based risk threshold. Detaining a thousand people who pose 
this degree of risk, for one month each, is projected to avert 512.5 violent offenses. 
But according to our survey-based standard, one thousand months of detention 
would have to avert the equivalent of 1000 serious assaults to be cost-justified.202 
200 None of the validation studies discussed here reports the release rate for the highest-risk group. But in 
data used by one of us in a separate paper, 50% of defendants flagged as high risk for violence by the PSA 
were detained throughout the pretrial process. Stevenson, supra note 138. 
201 All of the detained defendants (100% of 50%) in addition to 2.5% of the released defendants (2.5% of 
the other 50%) would be rearrested for a violent offense; equivalently (0.5*1) + (0.5*0.025) = 0.5125 of all 
defendants. 
202 Given that the average “violent offense” is likely to be less grave than serious assault, it is unlikely that 
offense severity makes up the difference. See supra note 145. 
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A 51.25% chance of violent rearrest within fifteen days might justify fifteen days 
of detention.203 But even on extreme assumptions about selection bias, 
contemporary risk assessment tools do not appear capable of identifying crime-risk 
sufficient to justify typical preventive detention.204 
There is, however, a second reason that the rearrest rate of high-risk 
defendants might understate the riskiness of that group: not all crimes result in 
arrest. Table 3 shows 2017 estimates of the national number of arrests and crime 
victimizations for aggravated assault, burglary and simple assault.205 The final 
column shows the crime-to-arrest rate for each offense.  
Table 3: National Arrest versus Crime-Victimization Rates 
Arrest Crimes Crimes per arrest 
Robbery 94,046 613,837 6.53 
Ag. Assault 388,927 993,173 2.55 
Burglary 199,266 2,538,165 12.74 
Simple assault 1,062,370 3,611,678 3.4 
We can account for this concern by using the crime-to-arrest ratio to “scale 
up” the rearrest rates reported in the risk assessment validation studies. A violent-
rearrest rate of 2.5% within a month implies that for every thousand people 
released, twenty-five will be rearrested for violence within thirty days. Detaining 
one thousand such people for a month, conversely, is projected to avert twenty-five 
violent rearrests. The highest crime-to-arrest rate in Table 3 is 12.74, for burglary. 
Applying this very conservative ratio, we assume that averting twenty-five arrests 
means averting 318 crimes. Yet even if all 318 crimes were for serious assault—an 
unlikely assumption206—this still would be far too low a number to justify 
preventive detention using our survey-based standard. To justify the detention of a 
thousand people for one month each, we would have to prevent the equivalent of at 
least 1000 serious assaults, not 318. 
If one were to combine all of our extremely conservative assumptions at 
once, pretrial detention might be justified for the highest-risk category. However, 
we expect that these conservative assumptions are much too conservative – under 
a more realistic combination of assumptions we think it is highly unlikely that the 
203 Note that even if 99% of the highest-risk group would commit serious assault within a month if 
released, a month of preventive detention would still not be warranted. Our survey respondents saw 100 months 
of lost liberty as a greater cost than 99 assaults. 
204 If 90% of the high-risk defendants were detained, the average violent rearrest rate would be 90.25% 
(.9*1+.1*.025) – still too low. 
205 Arrest rates are nationally representative estimates from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. See Crime 
in the United States 2017, supra note 145, at tbl.1. Crime victimization rates are nationally representative 
estimates from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).  
206 See supra note 145. 
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highest-risk category of defendants pose a risk that would warrant preventive 
detention. 
